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Abstract 
Two desirable properties for a tax system that must specify tax treatments for new 
financial instruments are consistency and universality. A tax system is universal if the 
system can designate a tax treatment for any cash flow pattern. Consistency requires 
that the tax treatment for each cash flow pattern be unique. A third property, linearity, 
holds if dividing the cash flow into different combinations of securities will not affect the 
tax treatment. 
One way to achieve consistency and universality is to construct a tax system with a 
single systematic pattern of taxation, such as cash flow taxation or accretion taxation. 
But this extreme degree of homogeneity is not necessary. Consistent and universal tax 
systems can harbor radically different treatments for different types of transactions. 
"Bifurcation approaches" divide a new financial instrument into certain prototype 
transactions with known tax treatments. The tax treatment for the new instrument is the 
sum of the tax treatments of the prototypes that sum up to the instrument. "Integration 
approaches" use rules that tax aggregates of instruments within the taxpayer's portfolio. 
Bifurcation methods have a natural connection to linearity. These methods will not 
achieve consistency and universality in a nonlinear setting unless they are accompanied 
by elements of an integration approach. All universal and linear tax systems can be 
generated by "the spanning method," a specific kind of bifurcation. 
Spanning method approaches are only a subclass of a broader set of integration ap� 
proaches that achieve consistency and universality. In evaluating integration approaches, 
a key property is continuity, the requirement that tax treatments do not jump in response 
to small changes in any given portfolio. Continuity is a generalization of consistency. The 
existence of jumps leads to the possibility of serious tax manipulation of the same sort 
that would arise from inconsistencies. 
The current U.S. tax system includes some direct inconsistencies. That is, the same 
transaction can be packaged different ways to achieve different tax results. These in­
consistencies can only be eliminated by fundamental reform. Even the most powerful 
integration approaches cannot address the problem of direct inconsistencies. 
This fact raises difficulties for authorities such as the Treasury Department and the 
courts who have only low level reform at their disposal. In promulgating regulations 
or deciding cases that involve new financial instruments, these authorities must choose 
rules using a second best approach. Loose ends in the form of inconsistencies or lack of 
universality are inevitable. 
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Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework 
Jeff Strnad* 
The last two decades have witnessed the advent of ''financial engineering.'' 
Investment bankers, lawyers and other specialists have created innovative and 
sometimes complex financial instruments that allow investors and issuers to hedge 
risks, to speculate, and to achieve desirable tax results. The monetary volume of 
these new instruments is staggering. 1 
Financial innovation poses a deep challenge for tax policy. The current U.S. 
tax system works by using "tax cubbyholes," a few idealized transactions for 
which the system specifies an exact tax treatment. 2 Since any given new 
* John B. Milliken Professor of Taxation, University of Southern California, and Professor of 
Law and Economics, California Institute of Technology. I am grateful for valuable conunents 
from participants in the Harvard Tax Policy Workshop, participants in the Southern California Tax 
Policy Group and, outside the workshop context, from Don Brown, Tom Griffith, Henry Hu, 
Louis Kaplow, Bill Klein, Mike Knoll, Ed McCaffery, Roberta Romano, Ted Sims and Al 
Warren. All errors are my own responsibility. 
1. For several major categories of new financial assets, the aggregate principal amount of all 
outstanding notional principal contracts is in the trillions of dollars. The total notional amount for 
"swaps," a set of recently developed instrnments, exceeds the combined value of all shares listed 
on the New York and Tokyo stock exchanges. See Henry T. C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: 
The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 Yale L.J. 
1457, 1548-60 (1993) [hereinafter, Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives]; Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity 
Derivative Products: Financial Innovation's Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69 Texas Law 
Review 1319, 1320 (1991); William Glasgall & Bill Javetski, Swap Fever: Big Money, Big Risks, 
Business W.ek, June 1, 1992, at 102. The measurement of volume is in "notional amount" 
because many new instruments are "derivatives" with payouts that depend on the returns to a 
fixed amount of some other security or securities. See Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra, at 
1458-60, 1167 n.44. This fixed amount is the notional amount. For example, an instrument 
might pay an amount equal to the interest payments on $10, 000, 000 of a particular kind of floating 
rate debt. 
It is not only the sheer volume of individual new instruments that is impressive. Financial 
innovators are introducing new instruments at unparalleled rates, and these instruments often reach 
large volumes after a very steep exponential increase. See id. 
2. See Kleinbard, supra note I, at 1320; Briffet, Avoiding New Evils by Applying New 
Remedies: Taxes and the Cross-Border Transaction, J. App. Corp. Fin. ,  Winter 1992, at 109, 
110. Classification of new financial products in the face of rapid iunovation is a problem for 
fmancial regulation and corporate law as well as tax Jaw. In fact, the cubbyhole description put 
forward by both Briffet and Kleinbard had its origin in work by Henry Hu that focuses largely on 
these other fields of law. Professor Hu's work contains an admirable discussion of the 
classification problem in general. See Henry T. C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process Financial 
Innovation and the 'htlnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 333, 335-39, 392-
412 (1989) (general discussion with application to bank regulation) [hereinafter, Hu, Regulatory 
Paradigm]; Henry T. C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial 
Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder W.lfare, 69 Texas L. Rev. 1273, 1292-1300, 1311-12 
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financial product is unlikely to fit squarely into one particular cubbyhole, the 
appropriate tax treatment for such products is often unclear. 
This type of tax indeterminacy has fostered extensive debate and numerous 
proposals concerning the new financial product known as "contingent debt. "3 
Traditional debt consists of an obligation specifying fixed interest and principal 
payments. Contingent debt, on the other hand, combines fixed payments with 
additional payments that depend on uncertain future events (such as the level of a 
commodity price or equity index). 
The proposals put forward for taxing contingent debt reflect four theoretical 
approaches for taxing new financial products: bifurcation, integration, local 
pattern taxation and global pattern taxation.4 
The ''bifurcation'' approach decomposes a new financial product into a 
collection of component instruments, each with a known tax treatment.5 The 
1991  version of the Proposed Treasury Regulations for contingent debt apply this 
(1991) (classification problem with application to core principles of corporate law) [hereinafter, 
Hu, Shareholder lli>lfare]; Kleinbard, supra note 1, at 1320 n.1 and 1353 n.101; Briffet, supra, at 
110 n.6. 
3. See, e.g., Randall K. Kau, Carving Up Assets and Liabilities --Integration or Bifurcation 
of Financial Products, 63 TAXES 1003, at 1003-1014 (1990) (proposing an "integration" approach 
to minimize mismatching of timing, source and character); Edward D. Kleinbard, Beyond Good 
and Evil Debt (And Debt Hedges): A Cost of Capital Allowance System, 67 TAXES 943, at 943-61 
(1989) (discounting the integration argument and traditional analyses in favor of a capital cost 
allowance system); David P. Hariton, New Rules Bifurcating Contingent Debt --A Mistake?, 51 
TAX NOTES 235, 235-39 (1991) (questioning the bifurcation approach advocated in the 1991 
Proposed Regulations due to its inability to handle contingent debt instruments); Lokken, New 
Rules Bifurcating Contingent Debt --A Good Start, 51 TAX NOTES 495, at 495-504 (1991) 
(countering Hariton's criticisms of the bifurcation approach); David P. Hariton, More on 
Bifurcation of Contingent Debt, 51 TAX NOTES 1075, 1075-76 (1991) (challenging the practicality 
of the bifurcation approach); Section of Taxation, The American Bar Association, Report on 
Amendments to Proposed Regulation Section 1.1275-4: Proposed Regulations Regarding Certain 
Contingent Debt Instruments Under the Original Issue Discount Rules, 53 TAX NOTES 1187, 1187-
1204 (1991) [hereinafter ABA Report] (recommending simplifying rules even if at the expense of 
some coherence). 
4. Indeed, the participants in the debate about the proper treatment of contingent debt apply 
their analyses directly to other financial instruments. See, e.g., Kleinbard, supra note 1 
(discussing the appropriate tax treatment for various equity swaps and other derivatives); David P. 
Hariton, Equity Swaps, New Regulations, and Ed Kleinbard's Article, 52 TAX NOTES 1221, at 
1221-1224 (1991) (critiquing Kleinbard's integration argument in favor of a more rule-intensive 
approach). 
5. Although "bifurcation" suggests division into two pieces, the literature uses the word to 
describe the decomposition of a financial instrument into two or more pieces. I follow that 
convention in this article. 
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approach. 6 Operationally, these Regulations call for subtracting the present value 
of the noncontingent portion (consisting of the fixed payments) from the issue 
price of the instrument. The noncontingent portion (fixed payments and their 
present value) is subject to the usual taxation rules for ordinary debt instruments. 
The remaining, contingent part of the instrument "will have the economic 
characteristics of one or more options or other property rights [which] . . .  can be 
taxed as they would be taxed if issued separately.' '7 Thus, it may be necessary 
to divide the contingent part itself into separate pieces each having a known and 
distinct tax treatment. 
"Integration," the logical complement of bifurcation, pools financial 
instruments together rather than splitting them apart. The resulting aggregate 
cash flow is taxed according to its ''predominant characteristic. ' '8 For example, 
several commentators suggest that where a taxpayer fully hedges the contingent 
portion of contingent debt, tax policy should combine the hedge position with the 
contingent debt and treat the consequent riskless cash flow as ordinary debt. 9 
6. See Prop. Treas. Reg. l .1275-4(g), 56 Fed. Reg. 8303 (1991). Treasury issued a later 
version of the Proposed Regulations for contingent debt on January 19, 1993 but then withdrew it 
along with other unpublished regulations on January 25, 1993 to allow reconsideration by 
incoming Clinton administration officials. This 1993 version abandons the bifurcation approach 
taken in the 1991 version. For a discussion of the 1993 version, see David C. Garlock, A Primer 
on the New Proposed (Almost) Regulations for Contingent Debt Instruments, 58 TAX NOTES 1225, 
at 1225-1230 (1993); David P. Hariton, Contingent Debt: Putting the Pieces Together, 58 TAX 
NOTES 1231, at 1231-1243 (1993). 
7. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking FI-189-84, 1991-1 C.B. 835 (in the fourth paragraph of 
"Explanation of Provisions"). The pertinent text of the proposed regulation calls for treating the 
contingent payments ''in accordance with their economic substance as payments pursuant to one or 
more options or other property rights." Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.1275-4(g)(4)(i), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308 
(1991). Neither the explanation nor the text of the proposed regulation specify a method for 
choosing one particular decomposition of the contingent payments into other assets. More than 
one such decomposition may be possible. 
8. Kau, supra note 3, at 1007. 
9. See, e.g., ABA Report, supra note 3, at 1199-1200; Kleinbard, supra note 3, at 953.
To see how hedging works, consider the following example. A company issues "gold 
bonds'' that feature a payment that is tied to the price of gold on the date that the bond matures. 
The company also buys gold futures. Purchasing these futures in the right amount provides an 
exact offset against changes in liabilities on the bonds because of fluctuations in the spot price of 
gold. Thus, an increase in gold prices would result in a heavier obligation under the bonds and in 
equal and offsetting additional gains on the gold futures positions. 
A possible motivation for the company to engage in this type of hedging is to achieve a lower 
cost of capital. Issuing gold bonds may be a cheap way to borrow money given inefficiencies in 
other segments of the capital market. 
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"Local pattern taxation" applies a single generic treatment to all new 
financial products. This generic treatment includes rules for timing, 
characterization and source of cash flow. The term " local" emphasizes the fact 
that the generic treatment applies only to new financial products. The tax 
treatment of preexisting financial instruments may deviate sharply from that 
generic treatment. One should note that local pattern taxation may be combined 
with bifurcation and integration. For example, a recent American Bar 
Association report advocates decomposing contingent debt into contingent and 
noncontingent portions (as under bifurcation) but then taxing the contingent 
portion as a single unit under a set of generic rules. 10 
" Global pattern taxation" applies a single generic treatment to all 
instruments. This approach directly responds to the idea that it is the current 
variety of distinct tax treatments for different existing investments that makes it 
especially difficult to prescribe tax rules for new financial products. For 
example, although equity investments with no current cash flows avoid taxation 
until realization occurs, interest is accrued and taxed on zero coupon bonds under 
the Original Issue Discount ("OID") rules even though there is no cash flow 
from such bonds until maturity. When an instrument combines the features of a 
zero coupon bond and an equity investment that pays no dividends, 11 it is 
This type of motivation appears to be very important in the real world. For example, the 
exploitation of capital market and regulatory inefficiencies is central to the classic "arbitrage" 
explanation for the growth of the multi-trillion dollar market in swaps. See, Hu, Regulatory 
Paradigm, supra note 2, at 350-53, 365. 
10. See ABA Report, supra note 3, at 1195-1201. The report uses a "cost recovery rule" for 
timing, requiring that basis be recovered before any gain is recognized. Gain would be ordinary 
or capital depending on whether the transaction is part of the "ordinary course of business" or is 
an "investment" activity. The report does not specify sourcing rules but strongly urges the 
development of a uniform set of such rules. Id. at 1200. 
A similar example is the "expected value taxation" system suggested by Professor Reed 
Shuldiner. See Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 
forthcoming 71 TEXAS L. REV. 243, 283-89 (1992). Under this system one would decompose 
each asset in1D a noncontingent portion consisting of all expected cash flows, and a residual 
contingent portion. An approach similar to the OID rules would determine the tax for the 
noncontingent portion, with income accruing based on the increase in present value as future 
expected cash flows approach. A realization approach would apply to the residual contingent 
portion, with no tax until the time when risk is resolved and final cash flows materialize. Id. , at 
285. 
11. For example, a "debt" instrument might consist of the right to receive $1000 plus the level 
of the S&P 500 index times $1 in ten years. The $1000 payment is fixed. Without the index 
component, the instrument would be a zero coupon bond. But the right to receive a payment 
contingent on the future value of the S&P 500 index is an equity interest equivalent to buying a 
stock that does not pay dividends and then selling the stock at a specified future time. 
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unclear whether income should be accrued and taxed or deferred until realization. 
Global pattern taxation would obviate such dilemmas by imposing a single 
consistent method (such as cash flow taxation or accretion taxation) to all 
instruments, including new financial products. 
Assessing the relative merits of these disparate approaches requires a 
framework by which to compare them. The development of such a framework is 
one of the main purposes of this article. The analysis that follows relies heavily 
on two distinct desiderata for a good tax system: universality and consistency. 
Two variants of the consistency principle, linearity and continuity, also play an 
important role. 
Universality requires that the tax system specify a tax treatment for every 
possible transaction. This principle is attractive both as an administrative goal 
and as an ideal in a system faced with financial innovation. If the tax treatment 
of particular portfolios of cash flow patterns is unclear, taxpayers and the 
govermnent will face heightened administrative costs. The government (in 
interaction with taxpayers) will have to specify rules for the ambiguous situations, 
and, prior to the development of such rules, taxpayers will be unable to predict 
the tax consequences of holding particular instruments or portfolios. 
Part of the difficulty for the current U.S. tax system in dealing with financial 
innovation arises because the system is not universal. The tax treatment of novel 
transactions is sometimes unclear. But even if a tax system is universal, financial 
innovation poses another set of potential problems. Innovative packaging of a set 
of cash flows may result in a tax that differs from the tax that would be due if the 
cash flows were packaged in a more traditional manner. In a tax system where 
the same pattern of cash flows may have different tax consequences depending on 
the form chosen for transactions or portfolios, taxpayers will expend resources 
searching for the most advantageous form. At the same time, the government 
will be concerned that many tax treatments will become "elective" for taxpayers 
who can change these treatments by recasting their transactions or portfolios. 
Thus, even if the tax system is universal so that the tax treatment of every 
transaction is clear, substantial administrative costs may result if arrangements 
that are equivalent financially do not have the same tax consequences. 
This problem motivates the idea of consistency. A tax system is consistent if 
and only if every cash flow pattern corresponds to a unique tax treatment. In 
such a system, it is not possible to manipulate tax outcomes by repackaging cash 
flows into different financial vehicles. 12 
12. Even commentators who believe that the consistency goal is unattainable still see it as 
normatively appealing. See, e.g. , Hariton, supra note 4, at 1224; Kau, supra note 3, at 1004. 
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Consistency is important not only because of the administrative costs that arise 
in its absence but also because of a close connection with "tax arbitrage." Tax 
arbitrage arises in its purest form when a series of transactions results in no net 
cash flow but provides tax advantages. Suppose, for example, that two portfolios 
result in the same cash flows but that the assets in portfolio one are capital assets 
while portfolio two produces ordinary gains and losses. Assuming both portfolios 
are likely to produce gains, an investor can make money at government expense 
( with high probability) by matching a long position in portfolio one and a short 
position in portfolio two. The long position results in capital gains while the 
short position creates ordinary losses in equal amounts, and the net cash flow 
from these two positions is zero. "Conversion'' of ordinary income into capital 
gains occurs because ordinary income (such as wages) will be offset by the 
ordinary loss generated by the strategy and replaced by the capital gains from the 
long position. If capital gains rates are lower than ordinary income rates, the 
taxpayer receives a tax reduction without making any net investment. 
This series of "conversion" transactions violates consistency because it is 
equivalent (in cash flow terms) to doing nothing, and the usual result for a 
taxpayer who does not engage in any transactions is that there are no tax 
consequences. In a consistent tax system, tax arbitrage is not possible. Since tax 
arbitrage tends to defeat distinctions set up in the tax laws (such as the distinction 
between capital gains and ordinary income) and tends to produce free money at 
government expense for well-capitalized taxpayers, the usual presumption is that 
tax arbitrage is an evil to be controlled. This view provides a normative basis for 
requiring consistency that goes beyond the goal of reducing administrative costs 
by making tax treatments determinate and unmanipulable. 13 
Bifurcation approaches appear capable of promoting the goal of consistency 
since these approaches tax each instrument an amount equal to the sum of the 
taxes on the components that make up the instrument. However, commentators 
have been extremely skeptical about the possibility of implementing operationally 
coherent bifurcation approaches. There are many ways to divide an instrument 
into pieces with known tax treatments, and different methods of division may 
result in different tax treatments for the instrument. 14 
13. There are a rew cases where tax arbitrage can serve positive social goals. In these cases,
arbitrage can induce price changes that are socially desirable. These price changes largely or 
entirely offset the tax advantages of the arbitrage itself. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Should 
Interest Deductions Be Limited?, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME­
CONSUMPTION TAX 195 (Henry J. Aaron, et. al. eds, 1988) (tax arbitrage from leveraged holdings 
of tax-exempt securities may lower the price of borrowing for state and local govermnents). 
14. Most commentators find this characteristic to be fatal. See, e.g. , ABA Report, supra note 
3, at 1194-95; Hariton, New Rules Bifurcating Contingent Debt -- A Mistake?, supra note 3, at 
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Integration methods suffer from similar ambiguities. There is more than one 
way to aggregate sets of instruments into groups, and the overall tax results may 
depend on the particular choice of groupings. In addition, the proper way to 
characterize a particular aggregate of instruments may not be clear in a system 
replete with distinct and sometimes contradictory tax approaches. 15 
Taxation based on local patterns also entails potential consistency problems. 
New financial instruments may generate cash flows arbitrarily close to those of a 
preexisting instrument with a known tax treatment. Unless this tax treatment 
happens to correspond to the generic treatment for new financial products, 
instruments with nearly identical cash flows may incur very different tax 
liabilities. 
Global pattern taxation is the only one of the four approaches that can achieve 
consistency and universality without an obvious operational or conceptual flaw. 
Because implementation of global pattern taxation would require systemic reform, 
this fact is of little comfort to administrators who must craft rules in a system 
arrayed with very different tax treatments that must be taken as given. 
The problems with the four approaches have fostered significant frustration in 
the literature. Even prominent commentators who have developed and critiqued 
elaborate technical approaches have resigned themselves to relying on reform 
measures such as ''common law development'' or an ongoing dialogue between 
the Treasury Department and tax practitioners. 16
Despite these bleak assessments, aspects of the theory of financial economics 
suggest that bifurcation and integration approaches are potentially viable. In 
particular, the literature on "spanning" provides an "atomic theory" of financial 
economics, in which it is possible to replicate the exact cash flow of any asset or 
portfolio by a unique combination of the elements from a specified set of 
assets.17 The specified set of assets thus "spans" the universe of possible 
financial assets and is therefore called a ''spanning set.'' 
237; Kau, supra note 3, at 1004. 
15. See, e.g., ARA Report, supra note 3, at 1 195; Raritan, supra note 4, at 1222.
1 6 .  See, e.g. , Raritan, supra note 4, at 1224 (ongoing dialogue); Lokken, supra note 3, at 504 
(common law approach). 
17.  See, e.g., Donald J. Brown, Charles D. Ruijsmans, and Bernardus de Pagter, 
Approximating Derivative Securities in !-Algebras, in POSITIVE OPERATORS, RIESZ SPACES, AND 
ECONOMICS, edited by C.D. ALIPRANTIS, K .C. BORDER AND W.A.J. LUXEMBURG, at 171 (1992); 
Donald J. Brown and Stephen A. Ross, Spanning, lflluation and Options, 1 ECON. THEORY 3 
(1991); Stephen A. Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90 Q. J. ECON. 75 (1976). 
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The possibility of spanning the entire economy with a fundamental set of 
assets raises the intriguing possibility that the tax law might simply specify the 
taxation of assets in the spanning set. To ascertain the tax treatment of any asset 
not in that set, including any new financial product, one would determine the 
unique decomposition of the asset into a weighted sum of spanning set assets and 
then add up the taxes for that weighted sum. Bifurcation would be a viable 
policy. 18 
Given the apparent simplicity of this method, one might ask whether it could 
work in a tax system where radically different approaches govern the tax 
treatment of particular transactions. For example, would the approach work if it 
is preordained that some transactions are subject to accretion taxation while cash 
flow taxation applies to other transactions? If the approach did work, it might be 
possible to retain some or all of the "tax cubbyholes" in current law while 
simultaneously taxing new financial instruments in a consistent manner. 
Part I examines this question by studying the "spanning method, " a 
bifurcation approach of the sort just outlined. Using the spanning method, it is 
possible to specify some "cubbyhole" tax treatments arbitrarily, and yet still 
construct a set of bifurcation rules that result in a consistent and universal tax 
system. However, the spanning method can succeed in achieving consistency and 
universality only for some configurations of cubbyholes and only if these 
cubbyholes are precisely defined. Short of fundamental reform, the present 
cubbyhole structure in the U.S. tax system precludes the successful use of the 
method. 
Part II generalizes and extends the results in Part I by probing the relationship 
between the spanning method and the set of all consistent and universal tax 
systems. Part II begins by showing that for every consistent and universal tax 
system, there is an integration approach that can implement that system. In 
contrast, not every consistent and universal tax system reduces to the spanning 
method. This result highlights the fact that the categories of integration, 
bifurcation, and local pattern taxation are not mutually exclusive. The set of 
successful bifurcation and local pattern approaches is a subset of the set of 
successful integration methods. 
The main task in Part II is to develop a logical taxonomy of theoretical 
approaches and then to relate this taxonomy to practical approaches such as 
bifurcation and integration. Developing the taxonomy and clarifying the 
18 .  So would integration. It turns out that whenever there is a bifurcation approach that is 
consistent, there is also a consistent integration approach. However, the converse is not true. See 
text accompanying notes 72-77 infra. 
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relationship between the various practical approaches requires the use of two 
refinements of consistency, "linearity" and "continuity." 19 
Bifurcation approaches have a natural connection to tax systems that are 
linear. A tax system is linear when the tax on any transaction equals the sum of 
the taxes on any collection of subtransactions that comprise that transaction. Part 
II shows that a tax system is linear and universal if and only if it reduces to the 
spanning method. Thus, the spanning method is not just one particular kind of 
bifurcation but is the paradigmatic treatment for any linear tax system. 
In nonlinear tax systems (such as the current system in the United States), the 
concept of continuity is important. Continuity exists when portfolios that are 
nearly identical have nearly identical tax outcomes. Continuity is a stronger 
condition than consistency but weaker than linearity. Thus, linear systems are a 
subset of continuous systems, which, in tum, are a subset of consistent systems. 
Part II shows that precisely the same goals that make consistency desirable, such 
as obviating problems of tax arbitrage, also make continuity desirable. In 
addition, since the current U. S. tax system has significant nonlinearities, certain 
continuous and universal integration approaches are the strongest candidates for 
dealing with new financial products. Unfortunately, despite the strength of these 
integration approaches compared to the spanning method, none of them are 
immediately applicable to the current U.S. tax system. Fundamental reform 
would have to precede their successful application. 
Consequently, this article ultimately adds to the skepticism in the literature 
about bifurcation, integration and local pattern approaches. 20 Short of systemic 
reform, crafting rules for taxing new financial products requires difficult, 
"second best" choices. Nonetheless, the conceptual framework developed in the 
article clarifies the available approaches to taxing new financial products and may 
inform the ongoing debate about whether and how to institute such reform. In 
addition, the framework transcends the new financial products area. Bifurcation 
and integration techniques exist in many other areas of tax law. The framework 
developed in Part II adds insight whenever the law requires either that a 
19. Consistency, continuity, linearity and universality are ideals of operational coherence for the 
tax system. However, this set of ideals is not comprehensive. There may be situations where it 
is desirable to sacrifice operational coherence for other goals such as economic efficiency or 
distributional equity. 
Nonetheless, because coherence is a significant concern for both taxpayers and administrators, 
the tax structure implications of different operational coherence norms are important. Moreover, 
knowledge of the circumstances under which these norms are not fully attainable is valuable for 
courts, administrators and legislatures who must balance competing goals in designing and 
implementing tax rules. 
20. See notes 14 and 15 supra and accompanying text. 
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transaction be divided into pieces and taxed according to tbe sum of tbe taxes on 
tbe pieces or that a series of transactions be aggregated and treated in a particular 
way independent of how the individual transactions would be taxed. Part III 
concludes by discussing the tax policy implications of tbe results in tbe article. 
I. THE SPANNING METHOD 
"Spanning" studies from tbe finance literature provide a critical starting point 
for discussing necessary and sufficient conditions for tax systems to be consistent 
and universal. The "spanning" literature ranges from straightforward early work 
by Professor Stephen Ross21 to recent work set in a very advanced mathematical 
context. 22 As mentioned above, 23 tbe spanning approach views any financial 
instrument as reducible to a combination of assets from a specified collection 
called tbe "spanning set." Under the "spanning method" tbe tax on the income 
from an instrument is set equal to tbe sum of tbe taxes on the income from the 
spanning set assets that comprise the instrument. 
In order to clarify tbe results from the spanning literature and to apply tbem 
to the taxation of new financial products, this Part proceeds in four sections. 
First, section A develops a simple example consisting of an economy with three 
financial assets to illustrate the operation of the spanning method. Second, 
section B employs tbis example to show that it is possible to use tbe spanning 
metbod to construct a consistent and universal system even when tbe tax law 
requires tbat particular existing assets be taxed in radically different ways. Third, 
section C shows tbat despite this positive result, consistency becomes unattainable 
when this system is "overconstrained," tbat is, if the system has too many assets 
with predetermined tax treatments. In addition, even when accommodating 
disparate tax treatments is possible, consistency may require a considerable 
sacrifice in terms of ''tax aesthetics.'' The treatment of some transactions will 
conflict with most major conceptions of how such a transaction should be taxed. 
Finally, section D provides some policy perspectives on these problems, arguing 
tbat implementation of tbe spanning method remains infeasible absent fundamental 
reform of tbe current system. 
21. See Ross, supra note 17. 
22. See Brown, Huijsmans & de Pagter, supra note 17; Brown & Ross, supra note 17. 
23. See text accompanying note 17 supra. 
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Consider an economy that lasts only two one-year periods.24 Within this 
economy there are three financial assets. Two of the assets are zero coupon 
bonds. One bond costs $100 initially (at "time O") and yields $110 at the end of 
year one. The other bond costs $100 at time 0 and yields $121 at the end of year 
two. Thus, interest rates are 10 percent per year for both years in the model. 
The final asset is a "stock, " representing the right to collect a particular cash 
flow at the end of year two. The amount of the cash flow is uncertain, but it will 
take one of five possible values: $121, $242, $363, $484, or $605. Each of the 
five outcomes is equally likely, and no further information is available about the 
likelihood of any outcome until the end of the two years. Consequently, the 
stock's expected final value is $363. 25 Assuming that investors are risk 
neutral,26 this $363 has a present value of $300 at time 0, which is therefore the 
price of the stock at that time. Furthermore, the stock will appreciate to $330 at 
the end of the first year. 27 
Finally, it is also convenient to assume that the five stock outcomes 
correspond to the five possible ''states of the world.' ' In other words, only five 
future environments are possible, and any ''risky'' endeavor is risky only because 
its outcome differs depending on which environment emerges. 
The first step in applying the spanning method is to identify assets derived 
from the stock and the bonds that "complete the market. " In economics 
24. Two periods are the minimum needed to be able to distinguish between cash flow and 
accretion treatment. The difference between the two treatments is that cash flow treatment allows 
deferral of the tax on gains until realization. Consequently, studying deferral requires a model 
with at least two periods. If there is only a single period in which all cash flows occur, accretion 
and cash flow taxation will be identical. 
25. $363 is simply the average value of the stock. Each of the five outcomes occurs with 
probability 1 /5 so that the average outcome is 363 
= 
(121 + 242 + 363 + 484 + 605) I 5. 
26. Assuming that investors are risk averse would not materially affect any of the results that 
follow. Those results depend only on the ability to replicate any possible cash flow pattern with 
some combination of assets from a spanning set. This ability is a function of the set of assets 
available and not of the degree of risk aversion of the populace. 
27. Since investors are risk neutral, they will use the risk:less rate of IO percent to discount 
expected cash flows to present value. Since the initial uncertainty about the risky outcomes in the 
economy is not resolved at all until the end of year two, each risky asset will increase at a IO 
percent rate until that time. Thus, during the first year the stock's price will increase by $30 over 
its initial value of $300. 
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terminology, a secuntles market is "complete" if for each state of the world, 
there is a portfolio that yields a positive amount in that state and zero in all 
others. 28 Each such portfolio provides "insurance" against a particular state 
occurring. 29 When portfolios may consist solely of combinations of the stock 
and the two bonds, it is impossible to construct an insurance portfolio for each 
state. Indeed, the only asset with varying returns is the stock, and it has positive 
returns in all five states. Completing the market, if it is possible at all, requires 
the creation of additional assets. 
A central result in the "spanning" literature is that it is possible to complete 
the market if and only if there is some asset or portfolio that has distinct returns 
in each possible state of the world. 30 In that case, the ability to create call 
28. The existence of complete markets simplifies the task of designing a tax system that is 
consistent and universal. In particular, the "sparming method" discussed in the next section 
works only when markets are complete. The spanning method is important since, as shown in 
Part II, a broad class of other approaches that guarantee consistency and universality reduce to that 
method. See text accompanying notes 73-76 infra. However, the existence of complete markets 
is not a sufficient condition for consistency and universality. These properties can only be jointly 
present if the tax system has a certain degree of coherence. This article shows that, absent 
comprehensive reform, the current tax system lacks that degree of coherence. 
If the results were not negative, it would also be important to consider the possibility that 
markets are incomplete. Given incomplete markets, it would be possible to relax the universality 
condition by requiring a specified tax treatment only for every attainable cash flow combination. 
It would not be necessary to specify tax treatments for the "missing" financial instruments 
corresponding to cash flow outcomes that are not attainable. The tax authorities would never face 
the need to know how to tax these instruments since these instruments by definition would not be 
present in the world. 
29. The amount paid for an asset with a positive return in one state and zero in all others is 
equivalent to an insurance premium. The positive yield on that asset if the particular state occurs 
corresponds to the payment of an insurance claim when an insured event happens. 
If all states are insurable, it is easy to see why markets are called ''complete.'' An individual 
can protect against any contingency that might occur. Since the ability to pass risks onto those 
most willing to bear them is an important economic mission for capital markets, completeness is a 
desirable property. 
30. Professor Ross proved this result in a two-period world with a finite number of states 
similar to the one postulated here. See Ross, supra note 17, at 84-86 (Theorem 4 and related 
discussion). Others have since proven similar results using models with a continuum of states of 
the world and multiple periods. See Brown and Ross, supra note 17 (continuum of states); 
FRAN<;OIS R .  VELDE, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY AND HISTDRY OF OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY, 66-70 
(1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (multiperiod model with continuum 
of states). These more general results require advanced mathematics, a framework using "Riesz 
spaces.'' 
The analysis in this article is limited to a much-simplified framework of a five-state, two­
period economy. A more complex model would yield results substantially similar to those 
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options on that asset or portfolio ensures a complete market. A call option 
consists of the right (but not the obligation) to buy a particular asset at a 
prespecified price. 31 That prespecified price is called the "exercise price" or 
"strike price." 
The basic idea behind this complete market result is simple: By creating call 
options, it is possible to "divide up" an asset with distinct returns in every state 
(such as the stock in this case) into a series of "insurance" portfolios that yield a 
positive return in one state and zero in all other states.32 This series of 
insurance assets is a ''spanning set.'' 
Working out an example based on the five-state economy described above 
helps to demonstrate how this method of completing the market works. As a first 
step, it is convenient to label the states by reference to the stock returns: 
I Table I: States and Stock Outcomes I 
State Stock Outcome 
A 121 
B 242 
c 363 
D 484 
E 605 
obtained here, and the added mathematical complexity would not add significantly to the intuitiw 
understanding available from the simple model. 
3 1 .  An option is a contract between two parties. The buyer (also called the holder) of a call 
option has the right (but not the obligation) to buy a particular asset, such as a stock, at a 
particular price as specified in the option contract. The seller (also called the writer) of the option 
agrees to sell the specified asset at the specified price to the holder of the option if the holder 
exercises the option. 
32. Alternatively, one can ensure complete markets by using only puts on the asset or portfolio. 
See Ross, supra note 17,  at 82 (Theorem 2 and related discussion). Puts consist of the right to 
sell an asset at a particular price. Both puts and calls are necessary in some cases where the 
exercise prices of all options are restricted to be positive. Id. at 84 (Theorem 3 and related 
discussion). 
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Next, consider call options on the stock that the holder can only exercise when 
they expire at the end of year two. 33 The value of each such call option at that 
time will be equal to the difference between the price of the underlying stock and 
the contractually specified strike price, if that difference is positive. Otherwise, 
the option will be worthless.34 
From this set of call options, one can create insurance portfolios that yield 
positive returns in one state but zero in all other states. This task is easy for state 
E. A call option on the stock with an exercise price of $484 will be worth $121 
if state E occurs and zero if any other state occurs. 35 
Creating insurance portfolios for states A, B, C, and D requires combining 
call options with differing strike prices. For convenience, denote a call option 
with a strike price of $X as C(X) and denote the stock as S. The following table 
shows various options and their payoffs in each state: 
33. Call options that can only be exercised on the expiration date are called "European" call 
options. In contrast, the holder of an "American" call option can exercise the option at any time 
between the date the option is written and the expiration date. European options suffice in the 
example developed here because all risk in the economy is resolved at the end of year two. 
Options exercisable only at that time will parse all the possible risky outcomes. 
34. Suppose that the strike price of a European call option is $X. If the price of the stock is 
$(X + Y) at the time of expiration and Y is greater than zero, then it is optimal to exercise the 
option. Since the option allows one to buy at $X and then sell at $(X + Y), the option will be 
worth $Y at the time of expiration. Conversely, if Y is negative at the time of expiration 
(meaning that the stock price is below $X), then the holder will not exercise the option. In that 
case, the option expires and is worthless. 
It is important to keep in mind that a call option does not obligate its holder to purchase at the 
strike price. A call option gives one the right to purchase at that price. One can choose not to 
exercise that right.  For a more in-depth introduction to options, see RICHARD A.  BREALEY & 
STUART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 483-534 (4th ed. 1991). 
35. This option gives the holder the right to buy to stock for $484 at the end of year two. If 
states A, B, C, or D occur, the holder will not exercise the option since the stock will be worth at 
most $484. However, if state E occurs, the price of the stock will be $605, and the option will be 
worth $121 ( = $605 - $484). 
Actually, any call option with an exercise price that is greater than or equal to $484 but less 
than $605 would suffice for insuring state E. Using an exercise price of $484 merely aids in the 
exposition of the example. 
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Table II: Option Payoffs in Various States 
Option 
State C(484) C(363) C(242) C(121) S = C(O) 
A 0 0 0 0 121 
B 0 0 0 121 242 
c 0 0 121 242 363 
D 0 121 242 363 484 
E 121 242 363 484 605 
As indicated in the table, the stock is equivalent to an option with an exercise 
price of zero. Denoting an insurance portfolio that yields $1 in state Z and 
nothing in any other state as P(Z), the following equations represent the 
combinations of the stock and call options on the stock that generate an insurance 
portfolio for each state:36 
P(A) = (1/121) x [S - (2 x C(121)) + C(242)] 
P(B) = (11121) x [C(l21) - (2 x C(242)) + C(363)] 
P(C) = (1/121) x [C(242) - (2 x C(363)) + C(484)] 
36. It is easy to verify these relations. For example, to verify the second relation (the one for 
P(B)), consider the following table of payoffs: 
Table of Payoffs 
State C(l21) -2 x C(242) C(363) Aggregate Payoff 
(sum of the 
previous 
three columns) 
A 0 0 0 0 
B 121 0 0 121 
c 242 -242 0 0 
D 363 -484 121 0 
E 484 -726 242 0 
one lo As the table indicates, combinin g ng p osition in each or C(121) and C(363) wiui two short 
positions in C(242) results in a portfolio that pays $121 in state B and zero in all other states. 
Dividing this portfolio by 121 yields P(B), paying $1 in state B and nothing in each other state. 
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P(D) = (1/121) x [C(363) - (2 x C(484))] 
P(E) = (1/121) x [C(484)] 
Negative signs in front of call options in the formulae denote the sale, rather than 
the purchase, of those options. Hence, appropriate long and short combinations 
of the stock and the five specified call options on the stock create insurance 
portfolios for each possible state. As a result, the market is complete in this 
example. 
One can fully describe any asset with payoffs at the end of year two simply by 
specifying its payoffs in each of the five states. Furthermore, any such asset is a 
combination of the five portfolios in the set {P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)} . For 
example, consider an asset that pays $2 in state B, $5 in state D, and nothing in 
the other three states. This asset is equivalent to a portfolio consisting of two 
P(B)s and five P(D)s. Moreover, since the P(Z)s represent combinations of the 
C(X)s, one can also describe the asset as a combination of the five underlying 
options in the set {C(O), C(l21), C(242), C(363), C(484)} .  Thus, any asset with 
payoffs at the end of year two is equivalent to some combination of these five 
basic options. 
It is also true that any asset from either the set {P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), 
P(E)} or the set {C(O), C(l21), C(242), C(363), C(484)} will replicate the one­
year payoff of any other asset or portfolio in the economy. In the model, all 
economic risk is resolved at the end of year two. Since investors are risk neutral, 
the value of all assets in the economy, including the stock, the bonds and the 
options will increase at the riskless rate of 10 percent per year during the first 
year. Thus, any of the assets in the two sets will replicate the returns on the zero 
coupon bond which pays $ 1 10 at the end of year one on an initial investment of 
$100. 
As the above discussion indicates, it is possible to replicate any two-year cash 
flow pattern by a portfolio of assets either from the set {P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), 
P(E)} or from the set {C(O), C(121), C(242), C(363), C(484)} .  Since payoffs in 
this model occur only at the end of each of the two years,37 some combination 
from each of these sets can replicate any financial asset in the economy. By 
definition, then, each of these sets is a spanning set. As such, each set is 
potentially useful for constructing a universal and consistent tax system. 
However, to ensure that the system specifies a unique tax outcome for each 
instrument, the spanning set cannot be "overspecified. " In particular, it must be 
impossible to remove an element from the set and still have a spanning set 
37. A more complicated model would permit payoffs at any time. Such a model would be 
mathematically more complex, but the results would be similar. See note 30 supra. 
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consisting of the remammg elements. 38 A spanning set with this property of 
irreducibility is called a minimal spanning set. 
In fact, both of the above sets are irreducible. Irreducibility is obvious for the 
set {P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)}. Each of the assets represents a two-year 
return of $1 in one of the five states of the world and zero in all of the other 
states. Removing any one asset from this set makes it impossible to replicate a 
nonzero return in one of the five states at the end of year two. Slightly more 
complex reasoning establishes the irreducibility of the set {C(O), C(121), C(242), 
C(363), C(484)}.39 
38. If it were possible to remove an asset from a spanning set and still have a spanning set, then 
that redundant asset would be equivalent to a linear combination of assets in the "reduced" 
spanning set. One could substitute this combination of assets for the redundant asset in any 
combination from the "original" spanning set used to represent a financial instrument. Thus, 
there would be two different representations for any such instrument from that spanning set. The 
tax treatment of the instrument would be ambiguous unless the redundant asset had exactly the 
same tax consequences as the equivalent combination from the reduced spanning set. One may 
assign tax treatments arbitrarily to the assets in a minimal spanning set and not worry about the 
tax system becoming inconsistent. That freedom vanishes when the spanning set is not minimal. 
39. The argument works as follows. For the set {C(O), C(l21), C(242), C(363), C(484)) to be 
minimal, it must be the case that each element is essential for spanning to occur. Refer to the 
returns in Table II, and consider first the problem of creating an asset that pays off only in state 
A. For this task, C(O) is clearly essential since it is the only asset with a nonzero return in state 
A. The next step is to show that C(O) may be combined with other assets so that the combination 
yields zero return in state B without also yielding zero in state A. The only asset in the set that 
will accomplish this task is C(l21) since it is the only asset besides C(O) that has a nonzero return 
in state B. The combination C(O) - (2 x C(l21)) yields a positive return in state A and a zero 
return in state B. However, this portfolio has the side effect of negative returns in states C, D 
and E. Thus, one must add as asset or assets that makes the return in these three states zero while 
retaining the zero payoff in state B and a positive payoff in state A. The asset C(242) is essential 
for this task since it is the only asset besides C(O) and C(121) that has a nonzero return in state C. 
It turns out that C(O), C(l 21) and C(242) suffice to produce an asset with nonzero return in state 
A and zero returns in all other states. 
To see that the remaining two assets, C(363) and C(484), are essential elements of the 
minimal set, consider the problem of designing a portfolio that pays off only in state C. Asset 
C(O) is the only asset with a nonzero return in state A. Since any portfolio including asset C(O) 
would yield a nonzero return in state A, C(O) cannot be one of the building blocks for the desired 
portfolio. Given that C(O) is ineligible, C(121) is as well since it is the only other asset with 
returns in state B. 
It turns out that the remaining three assets, C(242), C(363), and C(484), are all necessary for 
creating the portfolio with returns only in state C for the same reasons that C(O), C(121) and 
C(242) were necessary to produce an portfolio with payoffs only in state A. In particular, C(242) 
is necessary because it is the only remaining asset (after excluding C(O) and C(121)) that has 
nonzero returns in state C. Consequently, C(363) is necessary to cancel out the returns from 
C(242) in state D, and C(484) is necessary to cancel the returns in state E from C(242) and 
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It is no coincidence that each of the two minimal spanning sets defined above 
contains five assets. The model assumes that five states of the world are possible 
at the end of year two. At least five distinct assets are necessary to capture the 
distinct outcomes in these five states. 40 
Given the concepts just developed, it is possible to state two principles that 
are useful for designing a tax system capable of dealing with new financial 
products: 
Unique Representation Principle: In an economy with a minimal spanning 
set, any collection of cash flows has a unique representation as a 
combination of assets in that set. 
Nonunique Minimal Spanning Set Principle: If a minimal spanning set 
exists, it generally is not unique. 
Rigorously establishing the Unique Representation Principle requires some 
linear algebra. But the intuition behind the linear algebra is easy to understand. 
If there were two different combinations of assets from the minimal spanning set 
that generated the same cash flows, then subtracting the first combination from 
the second would yield a new combination with zero net cash flow. This new 
combination would include at least one asset with nonzero weight since the first 
and second combinations are different by assumption. Consequently, one of the 
assets in the minimal spanning set would have to be a combination of other assets 
in that set. 41 This relationship contradicts the assumption that the spanning set is 
C(363). 
40. Readers familiar with linear algebra will realize that the minimal spanning set in the 
example must have five elements. Because there are five states of the world, the returns in the 
second period form a five-dimensional vector space, with the return in each state representing one 
dimension. The returns from the assets in the set {P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)} constitute an 
orthonormal basis for this vector space since each asset in that set returns $1 in one distinct state 
and $0 in the other four states. Any other basis, i.e., any other irreducible set of asset returns 
that spans the space, must also contain five elements. Furthermore, the assets in any such basis 
must be an invertible linear transformation of the assets in {P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)} .  As a 
result, the argument in note 39 supra that the set {C(O), C(l21), C(242), C(363), C(484)} is a 
minimal spanning set reduces to showing that the returns from this set are an invertible linear 
transformation of the returns generated by the assets in the set {P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)}.  
For a general discussion of the relationship between vector spaces, bases and spanning, see 
KENNETH HOFFMAN & RAY KUNZE, LINEAR ALGEBRA 28-49 (2nd ed. 1971). 
41. For example, suppose that the minimal spanning set is {x, y, z} and that the following two 
combinations result in the same cash flow: 
3x + Sy + 2z; 
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minimal. If combining certain assets in the set replicates the returns of another 
asset in the set, then that asset must be extraneous. A spanning set is minimal 
only if it has no extraneous assets. 
The above five-state economy example illustrates the Nonunique Minimal 
Spanning Set Principle. There were at least two minimal spanning sets for the 
economy in that example. More generally, it is possible to show that there are an 
infinite number of possible minimal spanning sets in any economy where there is 
more than one distinct asset. This result stems from the fact that there are many 
ways to recombine assets from one particular spanning set to generate another 
such set. For instance, in the five-state example above, one could arbitrarily add 
any positive amount, a, of C(O) to each of the assets C(121), C(242), C(363), 
and C(484) in the minimal spanning set {C(O), C(121), C(242), C(363), C(484)} 
and still have a minimal spanning set. The new set {C(O), C(121) + aC(O), 
C(242) + aC(O), C(363) + aC(O), C(484) + aC(O)} transforms into the set of 
insurance portfolios, {P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)}, by first subtracting aC(O) 
from the last four assets and then applying the transformation from { C(O), 
C(l21), C(242), C(363), C(484)} to {P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)} given 
above. 42 There are an infinite number of positive numbers a, and each choice 
of a yields a different minimal spanning set. Therefore, there are an infinite 
number of such sets. 4 3  
2x + 3y + 7z. 
Subtractiug the secoud combiuatiou from the first yields: 
x + 2y - 5z. 
This third combiuatiou results iu zero uet cash flow siuce it is the differeuce of two combiuatious 
yieldiug ideutical cash flows. As a result, it must be true that 
x = 5z - 2y. 
In other words, holdiug asset x is equivaleut to holdiug a loug positiou iu five uuits of z combiued 
with a short positiou iu two uuits of y, aud auy portfolio formed from a combiuatiou of x, y, aud 
z cau be formed from a combiuatiou of y aud z aloue. 
42. See text accompauyiug uote 36 supra. 
43. A rigorous proof that there geuerally are au iufmi1e umuber of minimal spauning sets 
follows from the fact that auy set of assets generatiug returns that are au iuvertible linear 
trausformation of the returns from the assets iu the set {P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)} is a 
miuimal spauniug set. See note 40 supm. There are au infiui1e uumber of such trausformatious 
so long as the dimeusiou of the return space is at least one. In the example, the dimeusiou of the 
return space is five. 
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B. A Possibility Result 
The two principles derived in the previous section suggest using the spanning 
method to design a consistent and universal tax system. This method consists of 
three steps. First, one chooses a particular minimal spanning set. Second, one 
specifies a tax treatment for each asset in that set and a rule for determining the 
tax treatment for any possible combination of such assets. Third, one imposes 
the rule that the tax due on cash flows from any asset not in the minimal spanning 
set is the tax that would be due on the unique combination of minimal spanning 
set elements that generate the same cash flow pattern as the asset. 44 
The Unique Representation Principle states that for any given minimal 
spanning set and any given attainable pattern of cash flows, there is a unique 
combination of assets in the chosen minimal spanning set that will generate the 
specified cash flow pattern. This principle guarantees that a tax system generated 
by the spanning method will be consistent and universal. It will be universal 
because any asset (and thus any attainable cash flow pattern) is equivalent to some 
combination of minimal spanning set assets. It will be consistent because the 
equivalent spanning set combination for any asset (or cash flow pattern) is unique 
and each spanning set combination has a known tax treatment. 
The spanning method begins with the choice of a single minimal spanning set 
for implementing the method. A choice is necessary because the Nonunique 
Minimal Spanning Set Principle indicates that more than one minimal spanning 
set exists. It is possible to design a consistent and universal tax system that 
would apply different minimal spanning sets to different asset groups. However, 
choosing a single minimal spanning set makes it unnecessary to determine which 
minimal spanning set applies to any given cash flow pattern and makes it 
unnecessary to check for inconsistencies caused by applying multiple minimal 
spanning sets to sets of assets generating the same cash flow pattern. 45 
44. The second step in the spanning method, specifying the tax treatment for each asset in the 
minimal spanning set, is similar to the "cubbyhole" approach under current law which specifies 
the tax treatment for certain familiar transactions. However, the spanning method includes a 
determinate way of deciding how to tax an asset that does not have a specified treatment because 
it is not in the minimal spanning set. Under current law, there is no such determinate method for 
assets that do not fall into any existing cubbyhole. As result, it is difficult for current law to deal 
with new fmancial products. 
45. There are potential benefits from using more than one minimal spanning set. Some cash 
flow patterns may be easier to decompose (into spanning set assets) using one minimal spanning 
set while other cash flow patterns may be easier to decompose using a difrerent minimal spanning 
set. 
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To apply the spanning method in practice requires more detailed specification 
of the tax rules than simply setting out the three steps above. Of particular 
importance is the need to choose a method for determining the tax treatment of 
combinations of minimal spanning set elements. One simple choice for this 
method is a linear rule: The tax on a weighted sum of minimal spanning set 
assets is the weighted sum of the taxes on the assets using the same numerical 
weights. Thus, if stocks x and y are in the minimal spanning set, the tax on the 
combination of five shares of stock x and two shares of stock y will be five times 
the tax on a share of stock x plus two times the tax on a share of stock y. One 
might distinguish the spanning method that uses this linear rule for taxing 
combinations of minimal spanning set elements by calling it the linear variant of 
the spanning method. Because this article only considers this linear variant, 
however, no such special terminology is necessary.46 Thus, in all of the 
discussion below, the term "spanning method" shall mean the linear variant of 
the spanning method rather than the more general class of all possible spanning 
methods.47 
To illustrate the application of the spanning method, consider once again the 
five-state example delineated above. Suppose that the minimal spanning set 
chosen to apply the method is the set {C(O), C(121), C(242), C(363), C(484)} .  
Suppose also that someone invents a new financial asset called "D-insurance. "  
One share of D-insurance yields $121 in state D at the end of year two but yields 
$0 if any of the other states (A, B, C, or E) occur.48 
Having chosen the minimal spanning set, the next step is to specify the tax 
treatment of each of the five assets in that set. Suppose that the tax code calls for 
46. Clearly, it is possible to employ nonlinear rules for computing the taxes on combinations of 
minimal spanning set elements. The linear rule is particularly interesting because of the natural 
connection, described below, between the linear variant of the spanning method and bifurcation 
approaches. See text accompanying notes 73-79 infra. The linear rule also is natural for those 
who are accustomed to the present U.S. tax system. In general, the tax on n units of an asset 
such as a stock or a bond is simply n times the tax on one unit of the asset. Finally, variants of 
the spanning method with more complicated rules fall under the general category of integration 
approaches. The second and third steps of the spanning method assign a unique tax treatment to 
every possible cash flow pattern. Later portions of the article show that the set of all possible 
ways to assign a unique tax treatment to each possible cash flow pattern is a particular set of 
integration approaches. See text accompanying note 72 infra (Entire Integration Principle). 
47. This terminology is important because some of the results below concerning the "spanning 
method'' are only true when the linear rule applies for computing the tax due on a combination of 
minimal spanning set elements. See, e.g. , text accompanying notes 73-74 infra and note 74 infra 
(Spanning Method Principle: "spanning method" results in a "linear" tax system). 
48. The name "D-insurance" stems from the fact that holding the instrument provides 
insurance against state D occurring. 
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taxing these assets on a cash flow basis, but at unequal rates: a 40 percent rate 
for C(O), C(l21), C(242), and C(363), but a 20 percent rate for C(484) . 
Conceptually, this pattern is pattern is tantamount to permitting a favorable 
"capital gain" rate on the C(484) asset while taxing the remaining assets at a 
higher, "ordinary income" rate. 
D-insurance is equivalent to 121 units of the asset denoted P(D) above.49 
The unique decomposition of P(D) in terms of minimal spanning set assets is: 
P(D) = (1/121) x [C(363) - (2 x C(484))] 
The unique decomposition of D-insurance is therefore: 
D-insurance = C(363) - (2 x C(484)) 
Thus, under the spanning method, the tax on D-insurance is equivalent to the tax 
on one long position in C(363) plus the tax on two short positions in C(484). 
Applying the appropriate rates, the taxes faced by an owner of D-insurance at the 
end of year two in the various states are as follows: 
Table III 
State Return Tax Return Tax Return Tax 
on on on on on on 
C(363) C(363) -2C(484) -2C(484) D-insurance D-insurance 
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 121 48.40 0 0 121 48.40 
E 242 96.80 -242 -48.40 0 48.40 
This analysis yields one peculiar result: in state E owners of D-insurance pay a 
tax of $48 .40 even though D-insurance returns nothing in that state. This 
anomaly exists because the tax system applies different rates to cash flows from 
C(363) and C(484). Recall that the tax system treats D-insurance as if it were a 
portfolio of these two assets. Thus, when state E occurs, the $96.80 tax on the 
49. See text accompanying note 36 supm. 
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gain from the long position in C(363) exceeds the $48.40 deduction on the capital 
loss from the two short positions in C( 484). 
Thus far the analysis has had an optimistic tenor. If the government can 
identify a minimal spanning set, it can fashion a tax system that is consistent and 
universal . This "possibility result" holds true regardless of how the government 
specifies the tax treatment for assets in the minimal spanning set. The treatment 
of different assets may be conceptually distinct. 
Nonetheless, the positive tax on a zero net cash flow outcome for state E in 
the five-state example is disturbing.50 This result violates the "obvious" precept 
that an investor should not pay any tax if there is no "income" or "cash flow. " 
The cause of the result was the dissimilar treatment of certain assets. In 
particular, the system applied a more favorable tax rate to C( 484) than to other 
assets. Equalizing the applicable rates on all assets would eliminate the problem. 
However, disparities such as applying a special tax rate to C( 484) in the example 
may have countervailing theoretical or economic justifications. Although the 
spanning method allows the tax system to remain consistent and nniversal in the 
face of some desired disparities, there is a potential cost in terms of ' 'tax 
aesthetics. "  The tax treatment of some transactions will not make sense under 
standard tax concepts. 
50. One cannot justify this $48.40 tax on a zero net cash flow as an offset for some tax benefit 
resulting from the purchase of the D-insurance. To demonstrate this point, recall that D-insurance 
is equivalent to one long position in C(363) combined with two short positions in C(484). 
Assuming risk neutrality and an interest rate of 10 percent, one can calculate the prices of each 
option. A C(363) option pays $121 in state D and $242 in state E and nothing in any other state. 
The $121 and $242 cash flows have present values of $100 and $200 ($121 I ( 1 . 10)2 and $242 I 
( 1 . 10)2 respectively). Given that states D and E each have a 1/5 chance of occurring, a risk 
neutral investor would compute the present value of C(363) as the sum of 1/5 of $100 and 1/5 
$200, for a total of $60. Thus, the market price of C(363) must equal this $60 present value. A 
similar computation yields $20 as the price of C(484). As a result, the pre-tax price of D ­
insurance a t  time zero is $20, the $60 cost o f  buying one unit o f  C(363) less two times the $20 
revenue from writing a C(484) option. 
What are the possible tax benefits associated with purchasing D-insurance? The example in 
the text presumes that a cash flow tax system is in effect. In such a tax system, there is a 
deduction for net investment. At a 40 percent tax rate, the tax benefit for the $20 net investment 
would be $8. This amount would increase to $16 under an approach that considers the 
components of D-insurance separately: The holder would deduct the $60 cost of the C(363) 
against a 40 percent rate and would pay a tax at the special 20% rate that applies to C(484) on the 
receipt of the $40 from writing two C(484) options. In contrast to the possible initial tax benefit 
of $8 or $16, the tax at the end of year two is $48.40, and the present value of this tax as of the 
time of the initial benefit is $40. The resulting net tax of $24 to $32 in present value terms is 
totally inappropriate (under conventional tax reasoning) given that in pre-tax terms the net result 
for the investor is a loss equal to the entire initial investment of $20. 
24 Jeff Strnad 
In the "real world," tax systems often contain disparities and the U.S. tax 
system is no exception. An accretion type of tax applies to some assets while tax 
is levied on others only upon realization of gains or losses. Corporate assets are 
subject to an extra layer of taxation. Different rates apply to income from 
"capital assets" and "ordinary assets ." The loss carryover rules create an 
asymmetry between the taxes of losses and gains. The next section analyzes how 
these disparities affect the ability to apply the spanning method successfully. 
Unfortunately, some of the disparities cause "impossibility results" to replace the 
"possibility result" developed above. This consequence goes far beyond the 
problem that attaining consistency and universality using the spanning method 
may require a sacrifice in terms of "tax aesthetics ." 
C. Some Impossibility Results 
Any proposal for taxing new financial products faces the real world constraint 
that numerous assets in the economy have a ' 'predetermined'' tax treatment, that 
is, a treatment that a policymaker must take as given in devising rules. 
Predetermined treatments are especially troubling when they are based on 
differing principles (e. g. ,  an accretion approach versus a realization approach) . 
Such discrepancies preclude the use of global pattern taxation where a single 
principle (e.g. accretion) dictates the treatment of all transactions. The Treasury 
Department and the courts face precisely this scenario when determining the tax 
treatment of specific new financial products. Comprehensive reform to achieve 
a single global pattern for the taxation of all assets cannot be accomplished 
through regulations or court decisions. 
The effect of being constrained by predetermined tax treatments is evident in 
the five-state example from the previous section. In that example, the available 
assets were two zero coupon bonds and a "stock. " Under current U.S. tax law, 
a zero coupon bond is subject to "OID rules" that have an accretion aspect. The 
OID rules impute a stream of interest payments to the bond and impose a tax on 
these payments even though they are fictional.51 On the other hand, current law 
5 1 .  Pure accretion treatment would require taxing the total change in value of the bond each 
year rather than merely the ' ' inlerest component' , estimated under the om rules. These two 
approaches differ because the total change in value of a bond during each year may differ from the 
aruount of inlerest impuled to the bond based on the initial fixed schedule of payments. For 
example, if inlerest rates increase during the life of the bond, the capital value of the bond will 
decline so that the total gain in some years will be less than the aruount of interest impuled to the 
bond. Nonetheless, the om rules are a step toward pure accretion treatment. One can view the 
om component as an estimate of the annual change in value of the bond, and this estimated 
increase is taxed even though it is unrealized. 
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generally does not impose a tax on the returns from "stock" until they are 
realized as distributions or as capital gains upon sale. 
Taking these current law treatments as predetermined constrains the choice of 
tax treatments for the five assets in the particular minimal spanning set chosen for 
applying the spanning method. There is one specific combination of these assets 
that is equivalent to the stock and two other specific combinations that are 
equivalent to the bonds. The tax on these combinations must correspond exactly 
to the predetermined tax treatment of the stock and the bonds. 
Suppose that the minimal spanning set chosen for applying the spanning 
method is {C(O), C(l21), C(242), C(363), C(484)} .  This set is a particularly 
instructive choice because all of the assets in the set are call options, instruments 
that have a specific tax treatment under current law. For now, however, assume 
that the tax treatment of these instruments need not be the same as under current 
law. 
The stock in the hypothetical economy is simply the asset C(O), which is 
already an element of the minimal spanning set. 52 The initial value of the stock 
is 300, and there is no dividend or other realization event until the end of year 
two. At the end of year two, the shareholder receives a cash distribution 
(representing the total return on the stock) in exchange for each share. Thus, 
there is no tax at the end of year one, but the cash distribution net of the $300 
cost per share is taxable income at the end of year two. 
The two-year zero coupon bond appreciates from $100 to $ 1 10 during year 
one and then from $110 to $121 during year two. Under existing law, this 
appreciation results in OID income of $10 at the end of year one and $ 1 1  at the 
end of year two. Assuming a 40 percent tax rate, the bondholder will pay taxes of 
$4.00 and $4.40 at the end of years one and two respectively. 
None of the five assets in the minimal spanning set {C(O), C(121), C(242), 
C(363), C(484)} corresponds exactly to the two-year zero coupon bond. 
However, the bond is a simple combination of two of the assets in that set, one of 
which is the stock. Denoting the bond as B(2) and the stock as S, the following 
identity applies: 
B(2) 
= 
C(O) - C(121) = S - C(121). 
52. A call option with a zero exercise price on a limited liability asset (such as the stock in the 
example) is identical (in monetary returns) to the asset. Limited liability implies that the lowest 
possible payoff is zero, and a call option with exercise price zero is the right to receive any return 
above zero. 
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Because the tax treatments of both the stock and the two-year zero coupon bond 
are predetermined, this equation implicitly specifies a tax treatment for C(l21). 
The tax on C(121) must equal the tax on a position that is long one share of the 
stock and short one bond: 53 
C(121) = S - B(2). 
A party holding C(121) would deduct the $10 imputed interest on the bond at the 
end of year one, resulting in a $4 tax benefit given a 40 percent rate. At the end 
of year two, the holder would deduct $11  for that year's imputed interest on the 
53. This equation is the "put-call parity equation" for a case where the put has zero value. 
The general form of the put-call parity equation is: 
S + P = C + PV(X) 
where S is an underlying asset, C is a call on S at exercise price X, P is a put on S at exercise 
price X, and PV(X) is the discouuted present value of X, calculated using the time until expiration 
and a riskless discount rate. No put term appears in the equation in the text since the exercise 
price is $121, the lowest possible outcome for the stock. A put will only be valuable if there is a 
possibility that the value of the underlying asset will fall below the exercise price. The bond 
ensures a return of $121 at the end of year two. As a result, the present value of the bond is the 
present value of the $121 exercise price. 
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bond. 54 In addition, the cash distribution paid in exchange for the stock at the 
end of year two would trigger a tax. 
Because the tax treatments of the bond and the stock are predetermined, the 
policymaker no longer has the freedom to choose the tax treatment of C(O) and 
C(l21),  two of the five assets in the minimal spanning set. However, complete 
freedom to choose the tax treatment of the other three assets remains. 
54. Under current law, corporate issuers may deduct the imputed interest payments on zero 
coupon bonds. See I.R.C. § 1 63(e). However, it is unclear whether a deduction for imputed 
interest is available if a non-issuing entity (such as an individual investor) sells a zero coupon bond 
short. 
Selling short involves borrowing the security that is sold. Consequently, the short seller must 
pay the lender any dividend or interest payments due on the security during the period that the 
seller holds the short position. When these payments are in cash, it is clear from the statute that 
any short seller may deduct the payments as "investment interest" so long as the security sold 
short is not a tax-exempt security. See l.R.C. § 163(d)(3)(C) and §265(a)(5) (1994). The terms of 
the statute also include amounts "incurred" or "accrued," see id. , but it is not clear that these 
terms cover imputed interest since the short seller does not owe that interest to anyone. 
A zero coupon bond will tend to appreciate in an amount equal to the imputed interest, 
thereby creating a loss in that amount for the short seller. In the absence of being able to deduct 
the imputed interest payments directly, the short seller will be able to deduct them as a loss (to the 
extent they are reflected in appreciation of the bond) upon closing the short position. This result 
is disadvantageous for the short seller (compared to deducting each year's imputed interest 
payments against ordinary income) since the loss will often be a capital loss and since the seller 
carmot deduct the loss until the time of sale. 
A 1972 Revenue Ruling suggests that the government will treat obligations of a short seller 
other than cash payments discharging dividend or interest obligations as "amounts paid for 
replacing a borrowed security" which are nondeductible capital expenditures. See Rev. Rul .  72-
521 (holding that short seller may deduct payments covering cash dividends on the stock but may 
not deduct either the payment of a nontaxable liquidating dividend on same stock or the cost of 
covering additional shares from a nontaxable stock dividend). However, the Revenue Ruling is 
factually distinguishable since it disallowed deductions for nontaxable dividends. The imputed 
interest from zero coupon bonds is taxable. 
In general, to achieve consistency, a tax system must treat opposite positions symmetrically. 
In other words, the tax treatment that applies to a short position must be the "negative" of tax 
treatment for the corresponding long position. Otherwise, combining long and short positions 
would result in a net tax effect even though the cash flow outcome is equivalent to no position at 
all. Although special treatment (such as zeroing out the tax results) might be accorded to any 
situation where a short and a long position offset each other, such special treatment might not be 
very effective. A taxpayer could avoid the required special treatment by constructing positions 
that fall short of, but come close to, perfectly offsetting short and long positions. For a more 
complete discussion of this "approximate arbitrage" maneuver, see text accompanying notes 83-
86 infra. 
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Conveniently, the treatment of these three remaining assets can be chosen to 
create a generic treatment for call options. In particular, the government could 
tax each call option as if it were equivalent to holding the underlying asset and 
borrowing an amount equal to the difference between that asset's value and the 
cost of the option at the time of purchase. 55 This generic rule is consistent with 
the predetermined treatments for C(O) and C(l21). These predetermined 
treatments impute no borrowing for C(O) and $100 of borrowing for C(l21). 
C(O) is the underlying asset, the stock. Consequently, the appropriate amount of 
imputed borrowing for C(O) under the generic rule is zero. C(l21) has an initial 
value of $200 compared to the $300 initial value of the underlying asset, C(O). 
As a result, $100 of imputed borrowing is appropriate under the generic rule. 56 
This generic rule for call options conflicts with current law since current law 
does not impute borrowing to the holder. 57 However, given the predetermined 
treatments of the stock and the two-year zero coupon bond, consistency requires 
that an imputed borrowing rule apply at least to the C(l21) call option. 
One response to this problem is to revise the current rules for taxation of 
options. This reform would be very limited in scope, involving only three 
55. The writer of a call option would receive symmetric treatment. Symmetric treatment of 
short and long positions is necessary to ensure consistency. See note 54 supra. 
56. This generic treatment does not accord with the most general form of the put-call parity 
equation. That equation shows that the value of a call is a function of the value of the asset plus 
a loan plus the value of a put. The put has the same exercise price as the call and the loan 
represents the obligation to pay the exercise price on the expiration date of the option. 
Although the suggested treatment in the text neglects the put, including the put value in the 
formula does not present a consistency problem. Because the stock yields a minimum of $121,  
the value of puts at strike prices of $0 and $121 (corresponding to the calls C(O) and C(121)) 
would be zero, and these puts would not result in any cash flows. See note 53 supra. 
Consistency requires there be no tax consequences from any such ''investment. ' '  See text 
accompanying notes 12-13 supra (arbitrage transactions that cost nothing and yield no net cash 
flows should not have any tax consequences). Cf. text accompanying notes 49-50 supra 
(consistency may require tax on a zero cash flow outcome for an investment that is costly and that 
produces nonzero cash flows in some states of the world). As a result adding these worthless puts 
to any portfolio will not affect the sum of the tax treatments of the assets from the portfolio. 
57. Sale of an equity option before it expires results in a capital gain or capital loss. The 
capital gain or loss will be short or long term depending on the holding period for the option. If 
the option expires worthless, the tax laws treat the expiration as equivalent to the sale of the option 
on the expiration date for $0. Exercising a call option results in the addition of the option price to 
the price paid for the stock for purposes of determining the total cost basis of the stock. See 
l.R.C. § 1 234 (1994). 
Special mark-to-market rules apply to options on futures and other nonequity options. See 
l.R.C. § 1 256 (1994). 
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sections in the Code. 58 In addition, commentators have argued that the current 
treatment of options impedes the effort to design rules for taxing new financial 
products and has little or no justification on tax policy or tax theory grounds. 59 
Reform of the option rules therefore could be regarded as an easy step that would 
be quite worthwhile if it led to a coherent way to tax new financial products. 
Unfortunately, reforming the tax treatment of options will not suffice to 
ensure successful implementation of the spanning method. Other ambiguities and 
tensions deeply embedded in current tax law are substantial impediments. One 
example is the distinction between ''stock'' and ''bonds.'' This distinction is so 
ambiguous that direct inconsistencies in taxation result. 
Suppose, for example, that a corporation engages in a project with returns of 
242, 363 , 484, 605 and 726 in states A, B, C, D, and E, respectively. In terms 
of the economy in the five-state example, this project generates returns equal to 
the returns from holding one share of the "stock" and one two-year zero coupon 
bond. Consistency would require taxing the two-year coupon bond portion of the 
project under an OID approach. However, under current law, if the corporation 
finances the project with equity, it can defer the tax on all of the project's returns 
until the end of year two. In short, current law prescribes sharply different 
treatments for " stocks" and "bonds" without clearly distinguishing the two. 
Indeed, even the paradigmatic "stock" in the example contains a built-in bond 
component. 60 
The spanning method cannot deal with ambiguity that runs this deep. If tax 
policy requires distinct treatments for "stocks" and "bonds," these categories 
must be defined much more precisely. Implementing precise definitions, 
however, would require fundamental and comprehensive reform, overturning 
familiar tax treatments for numerous financial instruments. 61 
Professor Reed Shuldiner's rule of "expected value taxation'' provides an 
example of this kind of reform. This rule divides financial instruments into a 
noncontingent portion representing the expected return from the instrument and a 
58. l.R.C. §§ 1234, 1234A & 1256 (1994). 
59. See, e.g., Kleinbard, supra note 3, at 951; Hariton, New Rules Bifurcating Contingent Debt 
-- A Mistake?, supra note 3,  at 239. 
60. The stock returns at least $121 in all five states of the world. 
61 .  Rules that rely heavily on the fragile distinction between equity and debt also create major 
problems in corporate law. See Hu, Shareholder Welfare, supra note 2, at 1286-1300 (whether a 
security is equity or debt or a known hybrid of equity and debt makes a big difference in the legal 
rights of the holder; financial innovation has produced many instruments that are hard to 
categorize, even given established rules for familiar debt/equity hybrids such as preferred stock 
and convertible bonds). 
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contingent portion representing deviations from that expected return. 62 The rule 
would treat the "stock" in the five-state example as the sum of three two-year 
zero coupon bonds and a risky residue with zero initial value:63 
Table IV: The "Stock" and its Contingent and Noncontingent Components 
Return of Instrument or Component 
State 
Stock N oncontingent Contingent 
Component Component 
A 121 363 -242 
B 242 363 - 121  
c 363 363 0 
D 484 363 121 
E 605 363 242 
This approach eliminates "bond-stock" ambiguities by providing a 
determinate way to isolate the "bond" component from any risky investment. 
However, applying this method across the board would require substantially 
revising the current treatment of equity instruments. 64 
62. See note 10 supm (summary of rule) . 
David Hariton has proposed an approach for taxing contingent debt obligations that resembles 
Professor Shuldiner's rule. Under Harittm's scheme, taxable income in the form of interest or 
OID would accrue on the revised issue price of the debt at no less than the applicable annual 
federal rate. See Hariton, New Rules Bifurcating Contingent Debt -- A Mistake?, supra note 3 ,  
at 238. 
63. Three two-year zero coupon bonds would cost $300 at time zero and yield $363 in all states 
of the world at the end of year two. Since the stock's value at time zero is $300, the value of the 
"contingent" portion of the stock that remains after subtracting the three bonds must be zero. 
Table IV also illustrates why the contingent portion has zero value. The expected return of the 
contingent portion is zero, and risk neutral investors will value an asset with zero expected return 
at $0. 
64. In addition, applying this approach (or another approach with a similar ability to clarify the 
bond/stock distinction) only to new financial instruments will not result in consistency. The 
inconsistency problem arises from the tax treatment of old financial instruments. Two or more 
bond/stock combinations with identical cash flow patterns incur different tax liabilities under the 
existing rules. 
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D. A Perspective on the Results 
3 1  
The previous sections demonstrate that a tax system can be consistent and 
universal even when it treats certain classes of transactions quite differently. For 
example, one type of asset might be subject to an accretion rule while another is 
subject to a realization rule. 
However, the flexibility in choosing tax treatments is not unlimited. If the 
rules " overconstrain" the system by specifying a tax treatment for too many 
assets, the spanning method will fail. In particular, the number of distinct 
predetermined tax treatments cannot exceed the number of states. 65 In addition, 
even if there are ' 'many' ' states (as there undoubtedly are in the real world), the 
law must not contain direct inconsistencies such as that between the current tax 
treatment of options and the current tax treatment of stocks and bonds. 66 
Finally, even if the system is not overconstrained and does not contain direct 
inconsistencies, choosing radically different theoretical approaches for certain 
paradigmatic transactions can prove costly in terms of tax system aesthetics:  
Consistency may require a tax treatment for some transactions that does not make 
sense under any theoretical or conceptual approach. For example, investors may 
have to pay a significant tax in some instances where there is zero net income and 
zero net cash flow. 67 
Unfortunately, reform of the current system would require much more than 
making some simple adjustments and accepting some unpleasant aesthetics. The 
current system contains major direct inconsistencies. Although it would be easy 
to remove some inconsistencies, such as those stemming from the tax treatment of 
options, only comprehensive reform could remove others (such as those stemming 
Furthermore, applying a generic treatment to new financial instruments may introduce new 
inconsislencies into the tax system. One may be able to invent new instruments that replicate the 
returns of the "bond" and "s1Dck" assets 1D which the "old" rules apply. For example, an 
appropriale mixture of assets from the set {P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D), P(E)} consisting of insurance 
portfolios can replicate the payoffs of the stock: 
S = 121 P(A) + 242 P(B) + 363 P(C) + 484 P(D) + 605 P(E). 
Unless the generic treatment for this mixture of insurance portfolios is the same as the treatment 
of the stock under the existing rules, inconsislency will result. 
65. Thus, in the example developed in the text, having five states permits arbitrary specification 
of tax treatments for at most five instruments without introducing inconsistency. See text 
accompanying notes 55-56 supra. 
66. See note 38 and text accompanying notes 52-58 supra. 
67. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra. 
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from the lack of a clear delineation between "stocks" and "bonds"). 68 A quick 
survey of current tax law reveals a host of definitions and "imperfections" that 
are potential sources of additional inconsistencies and ambiguities: the distinction 
between capital and ordinary treatment, the "double taxation' ' of corporate 
income, the asymmetry in treatment between gains and losses, nonlinear (e.g., 
progressive) rate structures, and the body of source rules that deal with foreign 
taxpayers. In addition, the difficulties for the spanning method revealed by 
examining a simple economy as in the sections above would persist or intensify in 
a more realistic model with more than five periods and more than two states. 69 
The positive result that the spanning method can produce a consistent and 
universal tax system in the face of disparate tax treatments for different asset 
types is nonetheless interesting. Even substantial reform is likely to result in a 
''hybrid' ' tax system that does not apply the same treatment to all assets. It is 
useful to know that such systems may accommodate theoretically distinct 
approaches for different assets and still be consistent and universal. Furthermore, 
as discussed in the next Part, several approaches currently advocated for dealing 
with new financial products can only be successful if they reduce to the spanning 
method. 
II. BEYOND THE SPANNING METHOD : A GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
As noted above, 70 the prevailing view seems to be that global pattern 
taxation is the only comprehensive solution to the problem of taxing new financial 
products. If a particular generic tax treatment (such as accretion taxation or cash 
flow taxation) applies to all existing financial instruments, the government can 
simply apply this same treatment to any "new" financial product. While 
difficulties in implementation that require approximations and compromises might 
arise, 71 the approach would be clear and coherent. 
68. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra. 
69. The "real world" includes at least five outcomes and two time periods. Although 
increasing the number of states would increase the freedom to specify tax treatments, direct 
inconsistencies would not vanish. In addition, an increase in the nnmber of states wonld make 
computing the proper tax treatment for a "new" asset more complex and probably would lead to 
worse tax aesthetics. 
70. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra. 
7 1 .  See, e.g., Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 
YALE L. J. 18 17, 1891-99 (1990) (discussing the implementation of accretion tax when asset price 
paths are unknown). 
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The previous Part shows that by using the spanning method it is possible to 
design a consistent and universal system for taxing new financial products that 
does not require prescribing a comprehensive treatment for all transactions. The 
above analysis does not indicate, however, whether the spanning method is the 
only approach with that property. In fact, spanning method approaches are only 
a subset of the set of all successful approaches. Some alternative approaches are 
less restrictive but still yield consistency and universality. 
The major tasks of this part are to provide a logical taxonomy of theoretical 
approaches and then to relate this taxonomy to practical approaches such as 
bifurcation and integration that are discussed in the literature. To accomplish 
these tasks it is necessary to develop several refinements of the concept of 
consistency. 
Section A shows that all methods that are consistent and universal can be 
expressed as integration schemes. Thus, the class of successful bifurcation and 
local pattern approaches is a subset of the class of successful integration schemes. 
Section B introduces the property of linearity, a property that implies consistency, 
and states two principal results. First, any linear and universal tax system 
reduces to the spanning method. Second, any consistent and universal bifurcation 
approach must be linear. As a result, bifurcation approaches that are consistent 
and universal are equivalent to the spanning method. In addition, local pattern 
taxation will be consistent and universal only if it reduces either to the spanning 
method or to an integration scheme. Section C explores integration schemes. 
These schemes can achieve a consistent and universal tax system even when the 
system is not required to be linear. This trait is important since modern tax 
systems tend to have significant nonlinearities. Section C also develops the 
concept of continuity, a condition that is weaker than linearity but stronger than 
consistency, and shows that all continuous and universal tax systems reduce to an 
integration scheme. In contrast, the spanning method will only succeed if the tax 
system is linear as well as continuous and universal. Continuity is an important 
condition because in its absence all of the undesirable effects that follow from 
inconsistency would be present. 
A .  Entire Integration and Consistency 
Combining a taxpayer's portfolio into one single position and then associating 
a tax treatment to that position is a form of integration, called ' 'entire 
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integration. ' m Since any universal and consistent tax system associates to each 
total position a unique tax treatment, the following principle is true: 
The Entire Integration Principle: Any consistent and universal tax system 
is equivalent to an entire integration approach. 
Some integration approaches may aggregate only certain groups of instruments 
but not the taxpayer's complete portfolio. Under the Entire Integration Principle, 
however, any consistent and universal integration method can be treated as if it 
did integrate the whole portfolio, since each aggregate position must result in the 
same tax treatments no matter which combination of components led to the 
pos1t1on. Furthermore, any method that achieves consistency and universality, 
including the spanning method, also can be expressed as an entire integration 
scheme. Thus, all consistent and universal bifurcation methods and all consistent 
and universal local pattern approaches belong to the set of consistent and 
universal integration approaches. 
The spanning method is one particular method of bifurcation that assures 
consistency and universality. The Entire Integration Principle indicates that the 
class of consistent and universal tax systems are precisely those that are 
equivalent to an entire integration scheme. Do all such systems also reduce to 
the spanning method? The answer is that they do not. In the next section we 
show that the class of universal tax systems that reduce to the spanning method is 
72. Mathematically inclined readers will realize that there is an easy way to describe any entire 
integration scheme. It is a function that maps the vector space of portfolios into a vector space of 
tax outcomes. 
It is easy to see that the set of all portfolios, as well as the set of all portfolio returns (see 
note 40 supra), form a vector space. First, choose a particular minimal spanning set. Each 
portfolio is a unique combination of assets in this set. The amount of each asset in the portfolio 
are the "coordinates" of the portfolio in the vector space. In the text example, this vector space 
is a five-dimensional Euclidean space, the coordinates for each dimension corresponding to the 
amount of a particular minimal spanning set asset in portfolios located in the space. 
The space of tax outcomes consists of vectors specifying how much tax will be paid at the end 
of each period in each state of the world. In the text example, these vectors will be ten­
dimensional, representing the taxes paid at the end of years one and two in each of the five states 
of the world. Of course, the set of all possible tax outcomes in the example will be isomorphic to 
a space with fewer than ten dimensions. The taxes paid at the end of the first year are not 
contingent on the state of the world. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra. 
If we denote the space of portfolios as "P" and the space of tax outcomes as "T," then an 
entire integration scheme is a function e that maps P into T. Requiring that e be a function (rather 
than a correspondence) captures the feature that an entire integration scheme specifies a unique set 
of tax outcomes for each portfolio. 
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precisely the class of all such systems that are also linear. Some entire 
integration schemes are not linear and thus do not reduce to the spanning method. 
B. Linearity, Bifurcation and the Spanning Method 
A tax system is linear if the tax treatment of an asset or portfolio is the sum 
of the tax treatments of the components that make up the asset or portfolio.73 
Linearity requires that the tax treatment of any portfolio must remain the same 
regardless of the manner in which the portfolio is divided into particular assets. 
As a result, linearity implies consistency. Section C shows that there are 
consistent tax systems which are not linear. Thus, linearity is a stronger 
condition than consistency. 
The class of tax systems that are both linear and universal is exactly the class 
that can be implemented by the spanning method: 
Spanning Method Principle: Any universal and linear tax system is 
equivalent to applying the spanning method using any minimal spanning 
set. Conversely, the spanning method will result in universality and 
linearity under any choice for the minimal spanning set. 
Proving this principle is straightforward. Suppose a tax system is universal and 
linear, and choose any minimal spanning set. Since the system is universal, it 
prescribes a tax treatment for every asset, including each asset in the chosen 
minimal spanning set. Since the system is linear and since it is possible to 
express any cash flow pattern as a combination of assets from the minimal 
spanning set, the tax treatment of the spanning set elements uniquely determines 
the tax treatment for all cash flow patterns and assets. Thus, all linear and 
universal tax systems reduce to the spanning method. It is easy to show the 
converse: The spanning method guarantees that the tax system is linear. 74 
73. It is easy to define linearity mathematically using the framework of note 72 supra. In this 
framework a function e that maps portfolios to tax outcomes represents the tax system. That 
system will be linear if for any two portfolios x and y and for any two numbers q and r 
(representing ways of mixing the portfolios): 
q8(x) + r8(y) = O(qx) + 8(ry) = O(qx + ry). 
74. The converse follows from the assumption that the rule for computing the tax on 
combinations of minimal spanning set asset under the spanning method is linear. See text 
accompanying notes 45-47 supra. A portfolio is a weighted sum of a collection of assets, and 
each asset, in turn, is a unique canonical combination of assets from the minimal spanning set. 
The portfolio is also a unique canonical combination of spanning set assets. Since each cash flow 
pattern has a unique representation in terms of minimal spanning set assets, the canonical 
combination for the portfolio must equal the sum of the canonical combinations for the assets 
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There is a natural connection between the concept of linearity and bifurcation 
methods. "Pure" bifurcation approaches permit any decomposition of a 
particular portfolio for the purpose of computing taxes. An example is the 
bifurcation scheme in the 1991 version of the Treasury Department's proposed 
regulations for contingent debt. This scheme does not specify a particular method 
of decomposing contingent debt into pieces in order to compute the tax treatment 
of the whole. 75 Critics of "bifurcation" in general, as well as critics of the 
specific proposal in Treasury's 1991 proposed regulations, emphasize the 
possibility that different decompositions may lead to different tax treatments.76 
Where arbitrary decompositions are permitted under a pure bifurcation method, 
this problem will exist unless the tax system is linear. Linearity is a necessary 
condition for pure bifurcation to work since linearity asserts that the tax treatment 
of the whole is the sum of the tax treatments of the parts. But linearity is also a 
sufficient condition since linearity implies consistency. In a linear system, 
different decompositions cannot lead to different aggregate tax consequences. 
Conversely, pure bifurcation (such as the scheme envisioned in the 1991 
contingent debt regulations) will not work in a nonlinear tax system. In such a 
tax system there will be at least one portfolio and at least one decomposition of 
that portfolio under which the sum of the tax treatments of the parts does not add 
up to the tax treatment of the whole. To be consistent, the tax system cannot 
permit an arbitrary decomposition of any such portfolio for tax purposes. 
Instead, the tax system must assign a specific tax treatment to the portfolio that is 
independent of the treatment that would emerge from summing the taxes under 
particular decompositions. This feature is the hallmark of integration: The 
taxpayer does not have the freedom to characterize a transaction or portfolio 
position according to the tax treatments of the pieces but must apply a single 
specified tax treatment to the whole. To avoid the requirement of linearity but 
still retain consistency, an element of integration must be mixed with any 
bifurcation approach. 77 
comprising the portfolio. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra (Unique Representation 
Principle). Because the rule for computing the tax on combinations of minimal spanning set 
elements is linear, the tax on a combination from that set must equal the sum of the taxes on the 
components in any linear decomposition of that combination. As a result, the tax on any portfolio 
will equal the sum of the taxes on the assets that comprise the portfolio. 
75. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. 
76. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. 
77. For example, one might bifurcate according to one minimal spanning set for one type of 
transaction and according to a second minimal spanning set for another type. See note 45 supra 
and accompanying text. This approach would result in a tax system that is not linear if the tax 
treatments of certain transactions depend on which spanning set applies. To ensure consistency, 
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There is not much new to say in considering local pattern taxation. As 
demonstrated above, every consistent and universal tax approach is equivalent to 
some integration scheme.78 Moreover, it is possible to implement any linear and 
universal system using a bifurcation scheme based on the spanning method.79 
Departures from linearity require that the tax system include an integration 
element in order to maintain consistency. 80 Whether a system that employs 
local pattern taxation is linear or nonlinear, therefore, this ostensibly 
"alternative" approach is actually extraneous, at least for analytic purposes. 
C. Integration Revisited: Nonlinear Tax Systems and Continuity 
Integration by nature ignores the composition of portfolios in favor of their 
aggregate. As a result, under integration, a tax system can be consistent without 
being linear. The sum of the tax treatments of assets in a portfolio need not be 
the same as the tax treatment of the portfolio. Since consistency is a weaker 
the tax system would have to specify the treatment of such transactions, independent of the 
treatments that might arise from some possible decompositions. An element of integration would 
therefore be present. 
The spanning method avoids the need to use integration by requiring that one particular 
minimal spanning set be chosen for decomposing all instruments. See text accompanying note 45 
supra. 
78. See text accompanying note 72 supra (Entire Integration Principle). 
79. See text accompanying note 73-74 supra (Spanning Method Principle). 
80. q. text accompanying notes 76-77 supra (integration element must accompany bifurcation 
method when tax system is nonlinear). 
Introducing a local pattern may create nonlinearities. More specifically, if a particular 
portfolio of "old" instruments add up to a "new" instrument subject to the local pattern, 
nonlinearity (and inconsistency) will result unless the sum of the tax treatments of the old 
instruments in the portfolio happen to add up to a tax treatment that conforms to the local pattern. 
Avoiding inconsistency in this situation by ignoring the tax treatments of old instruments when 
they are combined to produce a new instrument amounts to an integration approach. 
The ABA Report on the tax treatment of contingent debt advocates an integration strategy as 
part of a local pattern approach. In particular, the Report calls for integrating the contingent 
portion of such debt and for taxing that part as a unit under a set of generic (local pattern) rules 
rather than attempting to decompose it into "component parts" for tax purposes. See ABA 
Report, supra note 3 ,  at 1 189 (recommendations (13) and (15)-(20)), 1 195. The stated rationale 
for this proposal is that bifurcation is a poor vehicle for achieving consistency because there is no 
unique way to decompose the contingent portion of the debt. See id. , at 1 1 94-95. However, the 
report is also skeptical about whether the integration approach itself could succeed in achieving 
consistency. See id. , at 1 195. 
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condition than linearity, successful integration approaches are a broader class than 
approaches based on the spanning method. 
Since every consistent and universal tax system reduces to an entire 
integration scheme, 81 classifying consistent and universal tax systems is a matter 
of classifying entire integration approaches. One part of this task is finished. 
From the Spanning Method Principle, 82 it is clear that the set of all linear and 
universal systems is precisely the set of all systems that reduce to the spanning 
method: 
Linearity Property: An entire integration scheme (i. e. , any consistent and 
universal tax system) is linear if and only if the scheme can be generated 
by the spanning method. 
To further refine the classification of integration approaches, it is useful to 
introduce continuity, a concept that lies between linearity and consistency. An 
entire integration scheme is continuous if portfolios that are nearly identical have 
nearly identical tax treatments. 8 3  In particular, small changes in any portfolio 
will not cause a "jump" in the tax results. 
Continuity is a stronger property than consistency. A tax system is consistent 
if there is a unique tax treatment for each cash flow pattern and if the law treats 
the long and short versions of each position in a symmetric way. 84 Continuity 
adds the requirement that the difference in tax treatment for any two positions 
must approach zero as the two positions converge. 
8 1 .  See text accompanying notes 72 supra (Entire Integration Principle). 
82. See text accompanying notes 73-74 supra. 
83. More rigorously, a tax system is continuous if for any position and any positive number (uo 
matter how small), it is possible to choose a range of portfolios surrounding the position such that 
the tax treatment of each portfolio in the range differs from the tax treatment of the position by 
less than the chosen number. For this statement to make sense mathematically, one must specify 
a norm for the vector space of positions and a norm for the vector space of tax outcomes. The 
Euclidean distance norm is oue possible choice for both spaces: for any two vectors x and y in n­
dimensional space, I x - y I , the norm of x - y, is the square root of the sum of the squared 
difrerences between the coordinates of x and y. 
Using the Euclidean distance as a norm, the usual definition of continuity applies: An entire 
integration scheme e that maps from the space of portfolios to the space of tax outcomes is 
continuous if for any position, p, and for any e > 0, there is a o > 0 such that I p - p' I < o 
implies that I O(p) - O(p') I < e .  
84. See note 5 4  supra. 
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A policymaker who values consistency will value continuity for the same 
reasons. More importantly, the absence of continuity may vitiate many of the 
benefits of consistency. Consider, for example, a system that is consistent but 
discontinuous, with a ' 'jump' ' in tax treatments at a particular point. It would 
then be possible to achieve "approximate" inconsistency by matching a long 
position very close to the jump point with a short position situated exactly at the 
point. The pre-tax net cash flow from these two positions can be made arbitrarily 
close to zero while leaving a significant net tax effect. Investors can therefore 
come arbitrarily close to achieving pure tax arbitrage. 85 Thus, a system that is 
consistent but discontinuous provides opportunities for tax manipulation that are 
almost identical to the manipulations possible in an inconsistent system. 86 
As mentioned above, continuity implies consistency and therefore is a stronger 
requirement to impose on a tax system. 87 However, continuity is a weaker 
requirement than linearity. Under fairly innocuous assumptions about the 
"finiteness" of taxes, 88 it is a mathematical fact that linearity implies 
85. Suppose, for example, that the tax system is consistent but that there is a particular point 
where the tax treatment shifts from capital to ordinary. Suppose also that portfolios near this point 
produce gains in most states of the world. One could set up a long position slightly on the capital 
side of the discontinuity and a short position slightly on the ordinary side. By moving these 
positions closer and closer together toward the actual point of discontinuity, one could make the 
combined cash flow from the positions arbitrarily close to zero. At the same time, the tax 
treatments of the two positions will match capital gains on the long side against ordinary losses on 
the short side, thereby creating a net tax advantage (conversion of ordinary income to capital gain 
income) with virtually no net pre-tax cash flow. The tax advantage will not diminish as the 
positions move closer and closer together, so long as they remain on opposite sides of the 
discontinuity. The taxpayer will have achieved "approximate tax arbitrage. "  See note 12 supra 
(using similar example to discuss "pure tax arbitrage" where a taxpayer can reduce pre-tax cash 
flow all the way to zero). 
86. See note 85 supra (providing example). 
Concern for continuity is evident in the tax policy literature. For example, the ABA Report 
on the treatment of contingent debt proposes to exclude instruments with de minimis contingent 
payments from the ambit of the contingent debt regulations. This measure would prevent issuers 
from being able to "elect" contingent debt treatment merely by including in the debt package a 
contingent payment that is nearly valueless. See ARA Report, supra note 3, at 1 192. This type of 
borderline issue would not arise in a tax system that was continuous. 
87. Continuity requires that each portfolio map to a unique tax treatment. See note 83 supra 
and accompanying text (definition of continuity) . 
88. The only assumption necessary is that the tax liability for any finite collection of assets will 
be finite. This assumption is met if there is a finite minimal spanning set such that one unit of 
each asset in the set incurs a fmite tax in every state of the world. Given that real world 
economies do not produce infinite returns, the idea that no security will lead to infinite taxes (in 
present value) is believable. 
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continuity. 89 In contrast, functions can be continuous but not linear. 90 
Consequently, there are continuous and universal tax systems that cannot be 
generated by the spanning method. Since these same tax systems can be 
generated by integration schemes (at least by entire integration schemes) ,  it is 
clear that integration is a more general method for achieving desirable tax results 
than any approach that reduces to the spanning method: 
The Integration Dominance Principle: Every continuous and universal tax 
system can be generated by an entire integration scheme. But a tax 
system must be linear as well as continuous and universal in order to be 
generated by the spanning method. 
Because bifurcation methods tend to succeed only in linear tax systems, the 
Integration Dominance Principle validates the common intuition among 
practitioners that integration approaches have greater potential than bifurcation 
methods.91 
This greater potential is of more than theoretical significance. The current 
U.S. tax system has many nonlinearities. Only integration methods will achieve 
continuity or consistency in such a system. One example of a nonlinearity in the 
system is the asymmetry in the treatment of losses and gains. Suppose that a 
start-up company can do project A or project B or both. Project A yields a 
$3000 profit or a $1000 loss with equal probability while project B yields $1000 
with certainty. If the company does only project A and sustains a $1000 loss, the 
company cannot deduct the loss immediately but must carry the loss forward and 
use it against future gains. However, doing project A and project B 
simultaneously results in inunediate use of the loss since the loss offsets the 
$1000 gain from project B. 
89. This result will be familiar to readers with some background in real analysis. A linear 
transformation between vector spaces is continuous if it is ''bounded. ' '  A transformation is 
"bounded" if all portfolios on the unit ball of the portfolio space have finite tax outcomes. 
Because all portfolios on the unit ball are weighted combinations of assets in some finite minimal 
spanning set and because the tax system is linear, the finiteness of the tax vectors corresponding to 
the minimal spanning set assets guarantees continuity. 
90. For example, consider the function f(x) 
= 
x', where x takes values in the nonnegative real 
numbers, and r is some positive real number other than zero or one. For any such value of r, this 
function is continuous but not linear. 
9 1 .  See, e.g., Kau, supra note 3 ,  at 1005-1007 (arguing for integration since it avoids the 
complexities inherent in bifurcation); ABA Report, supra note 3 ,  at 1 194-95 (advocating 
integration over bifurcation for the contingent part of debt). 
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These loss rules result in a nonlinearity. To see why, suppose that the 
applicable tax rate is 40 percent and that the company will not do any projects 
other than A or B. The taxes arising from doing project A and project B 
separately do not always add up to the tax arising from doing the projects 
together: 
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Taxes for Various Outcomes and Project Combinations 
(Given a $1000 Gain from Project B) 
$3000 gain outcome for $1000 loss outcome for 
Project A Project A 
Project A alone $1200 $0 
Project B alone $400 $400 
Projects A and B $1600 $0 
together 
In the case where the outcome of Project A is a $1000 loss, the separate projects 
incur a sum of $400 in taxes, but doing the projects simultaneously results in zero 
tax liability. 
The treatment of losses under current law is effectively part of an integration 
approach. That approach requires aggregating the income and deductions from 
all of a firm's projects and then applying a special tax rule when there is an 
aggregate loss. Because the ensuing tax system is nonlinear, the spanning method 
cau.11ot generate the same result. 
Despite the greater promise of integration methods, these methods are not a 
panacea for the current U.S. tax system. Any revision aimed at making the 
system consistent and universal would have to eliminate existing direct 
inconsistencies such as the ambiguous treatment of "stocks" and "bonds" 
described above.92 This task would require fundamental reform, whether 
accomplished using integration approaches or otherwise. 
92. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra. 
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III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. An Overview of the Framework and its Application 
43 
Part II developed a wide variety of results. This section provides an overview 
of the results and how they apply to the challenge posed by new financial 
products. 
Before beginning the overview, it is profitable to begin with a point that at 
first glance may appear to be of limited relevance: There are many areas of tax 
law that do not explicitly deal with new financial products but that employ or 
could employ bifurcation and integration techniques. 
Part II mentioned the integration aspects of the loss rules in current law. 
Another, more general, example of integration is the power of administrators and 
courts to apply the doctrine of ' ' substance over form. ' '93 This doctrine permits 
the administrators or judges to ignore the individual ' 'pieces' ' of a transaction and 
to tax the whole transaction according to their own view of the ' ' substance. ' '94 
Some examples of bifurcation approaches in current law stem from the body 
of rules that apply to the sale of sole proprietorships and partnership interests. In 
the case of a sole proprietorship, complete bifurcation determines the tax due 
upon sale. Rather than treat the business as an integrated entity, the tax system 
93. See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES 
AND GIFTS at � 4.3 .3  (2d ed. 1989). 
94. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). In Knetsch the taxpayer combined an 
investment in annuities with a yield of 2.5 percent per year with offsetting debt carried at a 3 .5 
percent annual rate. By agreement, the taxpayer could increase the amount of debt each year by 
the accrued 2.5 percent increase in value for the annuity. The 3 .5 percent interest payments on 
the loans resulted in a current deduction while the gain from the increased value of the annuities 
was both deferred and subject to favorable capital gains rates under the rules applicable at the 
time. Although the taxpayer incurred negative cash flows throughout the transaction (even 
assuming continual borrowing of the 2.5 percent annual accrual to the annuity contracts), the 
substantial tax advantages made the whole transaction quite profitable. 
Using a "substance versus form" approach, however, the Supreme Court denied the interest 
deduction for the borrowing. Id. at 366 (stating "it is patent that there was nothing of substance 
to be realized by Knetsch from this transaction beyond a deduction").  The Court implicitly used 
an integration approach since it considered the nature of the whole transaction rather than allowing 
the taxpayer to treat each part as dictated by the then current law. 
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assigns a gain or loss, whether capital or ordinary, to each asset of the 
proprietorship as if sold individually. 95 In contrast, the sale or liquidation of a 
partnership interest triggers a partial bifurcation approach. To the extent of a 
partner's share in certain "hot" assets, principally appreciated inventory and 
accounts receivable, gain upon sale is ordinary income instead of capital gain. 96 
This distinct treatment applies only to some "ordinary" assets of the partnership, 
so that the bifurcation is incomplete. 97 
Since bifurcation and integration pervade current law as well as proposals to 
address new financial products, the results developed concerning bifurcation and 
integration in Part II apply to many issues in current law as well as to provisions 
aimed at specific financial innovations. But there is also a deeper 
interrelationship. If current law uses flawed bifurcation or integration schemes, 
specific flaws can become focal points for tax-motivated financial creativity. It is 
the failure of the tax system to be consistent, continuous or linear that underlies 
any situation where ' 'choice' ' of tax treatments based on alternative ways of 
structuring transactions is a concern. 
It is worth summarizing the role that these three principles play with special 
emphasis on the implications for ' 'tax innovation. ' '  The three are logically 
related. Linearity, the requirement that the sum of the taxes on the components 
of a portfolio add up to the tax on the whole portfolio under every possible 
decomposition, is the strongest principle since it implies consistency and, under a 
reasonable "finiteness" assumption about taxes, continuity. 98 Continuity is the 
next strongest, being in essence a generalization of consistency. Continuity 
requires convergence of tax treatments as portfolios converge to a single 
portfolio, while consistency requires only that any single portfolio have a single, 
specified tax treatment. 99 
Bifurcation methods will succeed in general only if the tax system is 
linear. 100 The fact that current law has significant nonlinearities means that 
95. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 93, at 15 1 .9. The seminal case establishing this rule 
is Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2nd Cir. 1945). See id. 
96. See I.R.C. §75 l(a) (1994). 
97. In addition, partners can structure liquidations, adjust inventory holdings prior to sale, or 
make other adjustments to avoid the operation of the rules. See 2 WILLIAM S. McKEE, WILLIAM 
F. NELSON & ROBERT L. WHI TMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, , 
21 .01-21 .06 (2d ed. 1 990). 
98. See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra. 
99. See text accompanying notes 83-86 supra. 
100. See text accompanying notes 75-77 supra. 
TAXING NEW FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 45 
policymakers should be very cautious about these methods. Practitioners are 
familiar with many of these nonlinearities and the opportunities that exist to 
exploit them when the tax law uses a bifurcation approach. Consider, for 
example, the bifurcation rule mentioned above that applies to sale of a partnership 
interest. The general rule is that sale or exchange of a partnership interest results 
in capital gain or capital loss. 101 However, partnership holdings are divided 
into categories and to the extent that the partnership has assets in certain 
categories, gain on sale may be characterized as ordinary gain.102 One of these 
categories is "substantially appreciated inventory, " and this category includes all 
of the partnership's inventory if this inventory has appreciated by at least 20 
percent (over its adjusted basis) and comprises more than 10 percent of the 
partnership's noncash assets.103 The rule does not consider assets held by the 
partners outside of the partnership. Thus, the partners can contribute some of 
their noncash assets, such as short-term Treasury bills, to the partnership in order 
to ensure that inventories are less than 10 % of the noncash assets. 104 When the 
partnership is sold, the partners will receive cash corresponding exactly to the 
assets that they have contributed and can reinvest in these assets. This set of 
maneuvers involves no actual change in the partners' portfolios. Instead of 
holding certain assets outside of the partnership, they (temporarily) hold the same 
assets as partners. The result of this repackaging is a reduction in tax liability 
when the partnership interests are sold. 
New financial instruments provide new methods for dividing up cash flow 
patterns and thus more potential for exploiting nonlinearities. As it becomes 
easier and less expensive to invent new instruments, nonlinearities in the tax code 
that coexist with bifurcation approaches become a much more serious problem. 
Indeed, as mentioned above, some of these nonlinearities may be focal points for 
financial innovation. In addition, using bifurcation to address problems that arise 
from new financial products may fail, or even create new problems, in the face of 
nonlinearities. 
Successful application of integration methods does not require linearity. 
However, continuity becomes a serious concern. If portfolios with nearly 
identical returns have widely divergent tax implications, a taxpayer can " choose" 
101 . See I.R.C. §741 (1994). 
102. See I.R.C. §751 (a) (1994). 
103. See I.R.C. §751 (a) and (d)(l) (1994). 
104. See MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 97, at �16.04[2] (short-term, cash-like 
investments are included for purposes of applying the ten percent rule while cash itself is not) . 
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a radically different tax treatment by very slight portfolio changes, 105 or can 
engage in approximate tax arbitrage by being short in one of the two portfolios 
and long in the other. 106 An advanced financial engineering industry that can 
produce new instruments at low cost exacerbates these problems since the 
availability of new instruments makes finer gradations in portfolio choice 
possible. 107 
There are many familiar examples of discontinuities in current law. One need 
only look for sharp borderlines that delineate abrupt changes in the aggregate tax 
treatment of an asset or transaction. The borderlines between capital assets and 
ordinary assets, between short-term and long-term gains, and between passive 
income and active income are a few major examples. Another more detailed 
example is the substantially appreciated inventory test just discussed. A small 
change in inventories or asset composition in a partnership can determine whether 
the partnership passes the test and thus have very significant tax consequences for 
the partners. 108 
Existing discontinuities are focal points for tax-motivated financial innovation 
since new financial instruments permit a closer approach to the borderlines 
105. One can extend the continuity concept by requiring that tax consequences not change "too 
quickly' ' with any particular portfolio shift. Continuity guarantees that there are no sudden 
' 'jumps'' in tax treatment as investors vary the composition of their portfolios. However, one can 
imagine a sequence of continuous tax rules that involve increasingly drastic (but continuous) shifts 
in tax treatment near a given point in portfolio space and that will converge to a jump at that point 
in the limit. Continuous tax rules that dictate large shifts in tax treatment for small portfolio shifts 
can come arbitrarily close to tax rules with a discontinuity. 
106. See note 85 supra (example of approximate tax arbitrage). 
107. Short and long positions that are close to being exact offsets may not always indicate 
attempts at manipulation. Many of these matched positions may signify attempts to hedge business 
risk where only approximate hedging is available at an acceptable cost. For example, a company 
may have issued bonds with a payment at maturity that depends on the price 3-month Treasury 
bills at that time. The company might wish to hedge these bonds with Treasury bill futures. 
However, the most heavily traded Treasury bill futures contracts have standard expiration dates in 
March, June, September, and December. See DARRELL DUFFIE, F UTURES MARKETS 346, 350 
and 353 (1989). The bonds may matnre in some other month so that there is an imperfect match 
up between the publicly-traded Treasury bill futures and the Treasury bill price risk inherent in the 
bonds. Contracting privately for a Treasury bill futures contract with precisely the right expiration 
date might be so costly that the company's best strategy is settle for an imperfect hedge. Hedging 
business risks can serve socially valuable purposes. See note 1 1 1  infra. 
108. The test causes a discontinuity because passing over a particular numerical borderline 
abruptly changes the treatment of an aggregate of assets, in this case, inventories. Given this 
discontinuity, it is not surprising that the test also results in a nonlinearity. See text accompanying 
notes 1 00-104 supra. Linearity is a stronger condition than continuity, so that a discontinuous tax 
system cannot be linear. See text accompanying notes 87-90 supra. 
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between tax treatments. A closer approach means that investors will not need to 
alter the preferred pre-tax qualities of their portfolios as much in order to achieve 
desirable tax outcomes and that " approximate" tax arbitrage will approach pure 
tax arbitrage more closely. Thus, when integration schemes are on the agenda, it 
is important to consider how these schemes exacerbate or alleviate the problems 
caused by discontinuities. 
The serious administrative costs of discontinuities and nonlinearities are 
apparent from history. These flaws induce major struggles between taxpayers and 
the govermnent, often accompanied by new legislation attempting to curtail abuse. 
Thus, for example, the distinction between capital and ordinary assets, the 
distinction between short-term and long-term gains and the substantially 
appreciated inventory rule have each resulted in massive on-going administrative 
problems. 109 
B. Tax Policy Implications 
If current trends are any indication, the variety and heterogeneity of available 
financial products will continue to increase rapidly. 110 Such growth threatens to 
create greater and more frequent problems for a tax system already riddled with 
inconsistencies and discontinuities. Hence two profound challenges face those 
who create, administer, and interpret the tax code: First, how can the legislative 
branch of govermnent shape the tax code in directions conducive to a "good" tax 
system? And second, how should administrators and courts respond to the 
dynamic tax enviromnent created by financial innovation given that they cannot 
alter the major choices made by the legislature? 
The above analysis provides a theoretical structure useful for the debate 
concerning these ongoing questions. Each of the popular approaches for taxing 
new financial products fits into a larger framework. 
One way to achieve consistency and universality is to construct a tax system 
with a single ' 'global pattern' ' of taxation such as cash flow taxation or accretion 
109. See, e.g., BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 93, at ,51 and ,53 (overview of rules defining 
"capital assets" and holding period rules); McKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 97, at 
1 6.04[2] (manipulation possibilities currently available under substantially appreciated inventory 
rules and potential goverrunent responses); LIND, SCHWARZ, LATHROPE & ROSENBERG, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, 243-44 (Foundation Press 3rd ed 1992) (elimination 
by statute of second-tier partnership strategy for exploiting substantially appreciated inventory 
rules). 
1 10. See note 1 supra. 
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taxation. But this extreme degree of homogeneity is not necessary. A linear tax 
system relying on the spanning method can harbor radically different treatments 
for different financial instruments. Even linearity is not required. The most 
powerful and general approaches relying on integration methods can operate in a 
nonlinear environment. In fact, any consistent and universal set of rules is 
equivalent to an integration approach. However, an integration scheme must be 
continuous, rather than merely consistent, or manipulation through approximate 
"tax arbitrage" and other devices will be possible. 
The current U.S. tax system contains not only nonlinearities and 
discontinuities but also direct inconsistencies. For example, the tax treatment of 
equity and debt differ substantially, but there is considerable overlap in these 
categories. As a result, to a significant extent, financial engineers can package 
the same set of cash flows to be equity or debt for tax purposes. 
Repairing the major discontinuities and inconsistencies in current law is a task 
that would require fundamental reform. These discontinuities and inconsistencies 
arise from the debt/equity distinction, the distinction between capital assets and 
ordinary assets, the differential treatment of gains and losses by holding period 
and other aspects of current law that are central to the statutory scheme. 
Changing these aspects is only possible at the legislative level. Addressing major 
inconsistencies and discontinuities at that level would go a long way toward 
relieving the pressure arising from financial innovation. As discussed in the 
previous section, these flaws in the tax system tend to act as focal points that 
stimulate the development of tax-motivated new financial products. In addition, 
if administrators must take these inconsistencies and discontinuities as given and 
immutable, not even the most powerful integration techniques will succeed at 
making the tax system consistent or continuous. 
Even if the legislative branch implements some major changes, it is likely that 
some significant inconsistencies and discontinuities will remain. This fact and the 
darker possibility that no major reform will occur create some difficult choices 
for authorities such as the Treasury Department and the courts. These authorities 
are necessarily limited to prescribing "second best" solutions since no set of 
Treasury Regulations or cases can guarantee universality and consistency or 
continuity in the face of major inconsistencies and discontinuities that must be 
taken as given. Perhaps the only viable alternative for these authorities in 
addressing financial innovation is the traditional one of analyzing the normative 
stakes for each type of transaction and then crafting a detailed response.111 
1 1 1 .  The discussion in the literature concerning the tax treatment of contingent debt provides a 
good example of this type of analysis. Issuers of contingent debt often hedge the contingencies by 
purchasing or issuing other financial instruments. This hedging allows the issuer to shift the risk 
from the contingent portion of the debt to others, thereby facilitating a transaction (issuance of the 
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Since these stakes differ by type of transaction, comprehensive rules will not 
contingent debt) that can reduce the issuer's borrowing costs while simultaneously making capital 
markets more efficient by providing an instrument that investors want. See Kleinbard, supra note 
3, at 954. To ensure that asymmetric tax treatment of the hedge position and the contingent debt 
will not discourage such transactions, several commentators have advocated integrating the two 
and treating the entire package as debt . See note 9 supra and accompanying text. 
Not all corporate hedging transactions are socially valuable or are good for shareholders. See 
Hu, Shareholder Welfare, supra note 2, at 1306-1309 (hedging by public corporations can be 
wasteful when it is costly but merely eliminates risk that shareholders have already eliminated by 
holding diversified portfolios). But business hedging can serve socially valuable purposes. For 
example, investors may not be able to distinguish poor business performance due to market 
fluctuations from poor performance due to poor management. By hedging business profits, 
managers can eliminate the market fluctuation effect and thus provide clearer information to these 
investors. It would be unfortunate if the tax system discouraged financial innovation that permits 
socially valuable hedging. However, the private and social costs of any particular financial 
innovation may be quite subtle. See Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 1, at 1465-67, 
1465 n.31; Hu, Regulatory Paradigm, supra note 2, at 364-66. AB a result, choosing the best tax 
treatment for financial innovation involves some fairly difficult issues pertaining to capital 
markets. It is not clear as an a priori matter which financial irmovations are worth encouraging 
and which are not. In addition, it is not clear whether the tax laws are the appropriate vehicle to 
impose a subsidy or a burden. 
The picture is even more complicated because there are also a rich set of tax motivations for 
hedging. A firm may hedge to reduce fluctuations in taxable income and thereby reduce the 
possibility of a delay, due to the loss carryforward rules, in the tax deduction for current losses. 
Hedging also allows a firm to borrow more. It appears that the tax code currently discriminates 
against firms with low borrowing capacity, and crafting tax rules that fuvor hedging (or at least do 
not hinder it) may correct this discrimination. See Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How 
the Corporate Interest Deduction Discourages Innovation and Risk-Taking, at 20-25 (forthcoming 
Villanova L. Rev. , March 1994). Clearly, these considerations suggest a whole host of "second 
best" tax policy issues. The policymaker's attitudes toward the corporate interest deduction, the 
treatment of losses and even corporate tax integration are relevant. 
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always be desirable. 112 Loose ends in the form of inconsistencies, 
discontinuities or lack of universality will be inevitable. 
1 12. For example, it may be optimal to apply differing treatments to financial innovations 
connected with diffurent types of hedging transactions. See note 1 1 1  supra. in any event, the 
accumulation of regulations, each responding to particular instruments or special problems, may 
be unavoidable. Proposals that call for "common law development" or "a continuing dialogue" 
between Treasury, practitioners and taxpayers are not necessarily either soft-headed or a cop out. 
See note 1 6  supra and accompanying text. The gradualist theme in these proposals echo the more 
elaborate and general argument for an incremental, process-based approach to the regulation of 
new financial products made by Professor Henry Hu. See Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra 
note I,  at 1495-96, 1513;  Hu, Regulatory Paradigm, supra note 2, at 413-18,  435. Professor Hu 
stresses the informational disadvantages faced by regulators who must integrate new financial 
products into regulatory structures developed in response to existing financial instruments. Hu, 
Misunderstood Derivatives, at 1463, 1495-1508; Hu, Regulatory Paradigm, at 405-16. Although 
Professor Hu deals primarily with financial regulation such as the capital adequacy rules that apply 
to banks, many of his arguments have obvious parallels for the design and administration of the 
tax laws in the face of financial innovation. 
